{"id":132588,"date":"2021-04-26T18:30:47","date_gmt":"2021-04-26T14:00:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scfr.ir\/uncategorized\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/"},"modified":"2022-04-13T14:21:41","modified_gmt":"2022-04-13T09:51:41","slug":"sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Mehdi Shapouri, speaking in an interview with the website of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, said that the sabotage in Natanz facilities, under the current situation, should be investigated in connection with the ongoing negotiations for the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). He noted: The Zionist regime wants pressure and sanctions against Iran to remain and officials of the regime have repeatedly stated that they are opposed to the revival of the JCPOA, lifting or easing of sanctions against Iran, and that conditions should not be created for Iran to be relieved of the existing pressures; therefore, they seek to disrupt the ongoing negotiations to revive the JCPOA.<\/p>\n<p>He added: Of course, in the past one year, other measures have been taken against Iran\u2019s nuclear program, including explosion that occurred in Natanz in July 2020 and also assassination of Fakhrizadeh (nuclear scientist); which is believed that those cases have also been committed by Israel. This shows that beyond the negotiations related to the revival of JCPOA, the Zionist regime is trying to prevent Iran\u2019s progress, especially in the nuclear issue.<\/p>\n<p>Shapouri explained: This issue can be analyzed from two points of view; one is that the Zionist regime sees the Islamic Republic of Iran as an existential threat to itself and, therefore, sees Iran\u2019s acquisition of some military and nuclear capabilities as a threat to its survival. Second, it is a continuation of the regime\u2019s enduring policy of undermining the nuclear capabilities of countries in the region, especially rival and enemy powers; because according to the Zionist authorities, such capabilities can change the balance of power and deterrence. Israel has done the same in the past in Iraq and Syria.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Preventing strengthening of Iran\u2019s deterrence; consistent policy of the Zionist regime and the US<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Referring to the US involvement with Israel in some subversive actions, including spread of the Stuxnet virus at Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities, the expert on strategic affairs added: Preventing the strengthening of capabilities that could deter Israel\u2019s capabilities and bring Israel\u2019s deterrence under question is the constant policy of this regime. At the same time, this is in line with the US policies and interests regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the Biden administration\u2019s interim national security document which has been released recently, it has been stated: Regional players such as Iran and North Korea continue to pursue game changer capabilities and technologies; while threatening the US allies and partners and challenging regional stability.<\/p>\n<p>He said: Therefore, the United States and Israel are either involved in such actions against Iran\u2019s nuclear and military facilities, or they are aware of each other\u2019s actions.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Global reactions to the attack on Natanz facilities<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Referring to the global reactions to the attack on Natanz facilities, he continued: Some countries may condemn the blow on the Iranian nuclear facilities in their stated positions, but it should be borne in mind that some countries both in the region and globally, finally are satisfied with such events; because this will reduce the capacity or speed of Iran\u2019s nuclear activities. However, despite Iran\u2019s consistent policy and its repeated emphasis on the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, it is viewed within the context of nuclear proliferation discussions, influenced by the atmosphere of security and imaging of Iran\u2019s nuclear program by the enemies.<\/p>\n<p>Shapouri, saying that in the discussion of nuclear proliferation, the international community is the source of security, so the response to the threat is global and international, added: In fact, placing the threat of Iran\u2019s nuclear program as a threat to the international community increases the legitimacy of action against it and reduces the cost of action against it. This is a very important issue that the Islamic Republic of Iran must take seriously and not allow the nuclear program to be presented as a threat to international peace.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Concept of \u201cstrategic patience\u201d against the enemy<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The expert on international affairs further referred to the policy known as the \u201cstrategic patience\u201d and noted that this concept did not exist in the official policy of Iran, saying: This concept does not mean that no measure should be taken against the actions of the rivals and enemies, but, it is aimed at not giving the answer that the enemy wants; rather, give an answer that, while creating deterrence against the enemy, does not have negative consequences for our own interests. In fact, it is important to balance the benefits and costs of action.<\/p>\n<p>Shapouri explained: The meaning of strategic patience in relation to Israel and even the United States is that the response to their actions will be based on the time and place determined by the Islamic Republic of Iran and not within the framework they provide. In fact, the problem is not to fall into the trap of the other side. At the same time, it must be noted that the response to the actions of the enemy must be appropriate. If they took covert action, the proportionate response of the Islamic Republic must also be in the realm of covert action and, conversely, if they took open action, the Islamic Republic must also take overt action; like a missile attack on the Ain al-Assad base in retaliation for the assassination of Sardar Soleimani.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Lack of reciprocal response causes failure of deterrence <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Saying that based on the logic of responding appropriately to the enemy\u2019s covert action, Iran may have responded to many covert actions against itself, he added: If we interpret strategic patience as not responding, there may be significant damage to national interests and security of Iran; because it means that there is no cost to the other party\u2019s actions and it can intensify such measures. In the deterrent literature, this can even lead to war. In fact, one of the reasons for the failure of deterrence is the appeasement against actions of a rival or enemy.<\/p>\n<p><strong>60% enrichment; a strategic response to enemy action and a powerful tool for diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Referring to Iran\u2019s decision to carry out 60% enrichment, Shapouri called it a response to the sabotage in Natanz and said: If that measure had not been taken, I do not know that whether 60% enrichment would have been put on the agenda in the current situation. Indeed, this level of enrichment was one of Iran\u2019s responses to the sabotage at Natanz, and it emphasizes that attempts to deal a strike on Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities not only will not stop Iran\u2019s activities, but that Iran can pursue its nuclear activities at higher levels.<\/p>\n<p>According to Shapouri; in the current context of negotiations to revive the JCPOA, this also means that sabotage of nuclear facilities not only cannot empty Iran\u2019s hand in the negotiations, but also puts Iran at a higher level of bargaining.<\/p>\n<p>The expert on international affairs stressed that in the discussion of turning capabilities into advantages in nuclear diplomacy, as well as in the overall discussion of Iran\u2019s power, 60% enrichment by informing the IAEA could bring good results in the national interest; provided that care is taken that the enemy does not turn this action into further pressure on Iran. Here it is the art of diplomacy that can work. He continued: we should try to turn those capacities into privilege for the country with the tool of diplomacy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Strategic Council Online &#8211; A faculty member of the Institute for Strategic Studies, says that preventing enhancement of capabilities that could create deterrence against Israel\u2019s capabilities and bring Israel\u2019s deterrence under question is the regime\u2019s consistent policy. He added: If strategic patience is interpreted as not responding, there may be more damage to Iran\u2019s national interests and security.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":132547,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[12,13289,12726],"tags":[23457,24433,18851,22602,14775,12748,21351,27480,23982,27481,33399,27482,27479,26884],"class_list":["post-132588","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-defense-security","category-interview","category-10-en-2","tag-deterrent-power","tag-enriching-uranium","tag-international-community","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-jcpoa","tag-mehdi-shapouri","tag-natanz-facilities","tag-nuclear-power","tag-sabotage-in-natanz","tag-33399","tag-strategic-patience","tag-stuxnet-virus","tag-us-national-security-document"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.0 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence - Strategic Council on Foreign Relations<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"AGOL\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/d39f31143efe45f618d63ff00063e28e\"},\"headline\":\"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence\",\"datePublished\":\"2021-04-26T14:00:47+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-04-13T09:51:41+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":1245,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2021\\\/04\\\/ddx.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"Deterrent power\",\"enriching uranium\",\"international community\",\"Iran\",\"Israel\",\"JCPOA\",\"Mehdi Shapouri\",\"Natanz Facilities\",\"nuclear power\",\"Sabotage in Natanz\",\"Sanction\",\"strategic patience\",\"Stuxnet virus\",\"US national security document\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Defense &amp; Security\",\"interview\",\"Top News\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/\",\"name\":\"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence - Strategic Council on Foreign Relations\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2021\\\/04\\\/ddx.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2021-04-26T14:00:47+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-04-13T09:51:41+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2021\\\/04\\\/ddx.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2021\\\/04\\\/ddx.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":270},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/defense-security\\\/132588\\\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"\u062e\u0628\u0631 \u062a\u0627\u067e\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/category\\\/10\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/\",\"name\":\"\u0634\u0648\u0631\u0627\u06cc \u0631\u0627\u0647\u0628\u0631\u062f\u06cc \u0631\u0648\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u062e\u0627\u0631\u062c\u06cc\",\"description\":\"\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"\u0634\u0648\u0631\u0627\u06cc \u0631\u0627\u0647\u0628\u0631\u062f\u06cc \u0631\u0648\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u062e\u0627\u0631\u062c\u06cc\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scfr.ir\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/03\\\/Logo-Blue2.svg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scfr.ir\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/03\\\/Logo-Blue2.svg\",\"width\":1,\"height\":1,\"caption\":\"\u0634\u0648\u0631\u0627\u06cc \u0631\u0627\u0647\u0628\u0631\u062f\u06cc \u0631\u0648\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u062e\u0627\u0631\u062c\u06cc\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/fa\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/d39f31143efe45f618d63ff00063e28e\",\"name\":\"AGOL\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/scfr.ir\\\/en\\\/author\\\/goleazam\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence - Strategic Council on Foreign Relations","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/","schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/"},"author":{"name":"AGOL","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#\/schema\/person\/d39f31143efe45f618d63ff00063e28e"},"headline":"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence","datePublished":"2021-04-26T14:00:47+00:00","dateModified":"2022-04-13T09:51:41+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/"},"wordCount":1245,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/ddx.jpg","keywords":["Deterrent power","enriching uranium","international community","Iran","Israel","JCPOA","Mehdi Shapouri","Natanz Facilities","nuclear power","Sabotage in Natanz","Sanction","strategic patience","Stuxnet virus","US national security document"],"articleSection":["Defense &amp; Security","interview","Top News"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/","url":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/","name":"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence - Strategic Council on Foreign Relations","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/ddx.jpg","datePublished":"2021-04-26T14:00:47+00:00","dateModified":"2022-04-13T09:51:41+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/ddx.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/ddx.jpg","width":512,"height":270},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/defense-security\/132588\/sabotage-in-natanz-nuclear-facilities-and-the-question-of-deterrence\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"","item":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"\u062e\u0628\u0631 \u062a\u0627\u067e","item":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/category\/10\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"Sabotage in Natanz Nuclear Facilities and the Question of Deterrence"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#website","url":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/","name":"\u0634\u0648\u0631\u0627\u06cc \u0631\u0627\u0647\u0628\u0631\u062f\u06cc \u0631\u0648\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u062e\u0627\u0631\u062c\u06cc","description":"","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#organization","name":"\u0634\u0648\u0631\u0627\u06cc \u0631\u0627\u0647\u0628\u0631\u062f\u06cc \u0631\u0648\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u062e\u0627\u0631\u062c\u06cc","url":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.scfr.ir\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/Logo-Blue2.svg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.scfr.ir\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/Logo-Blue2.svg","width":1,"height":1,"caption":"\u0634\u0648\u0631\u0627\u06cc \u0631\u0627\u0647\u0628\u0631\u062f\u06cc \u0631\u0648\u0627\u0628\u0637 \u062e\u0627\u0631\u062c\u06cc"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/fa\/#\/schema\/person\/d39f31143efe45f618d63ff00063e28e","name":"AGOL","url":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/author\/goleazam\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132588","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=132588"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/132588\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/132547"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=132588"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=132588"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scfr.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=132588"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}