Hamed Vafaei \u2013 Professor of China Studies, University of Tehran<\/p>\n
The recent wave of visits by Western (especially European) officials to Beijing \u2013 Emmanuel Macron (December 2025), Miche\u00e1l Martin (Ireland, January 2026), Keir Starmer (United Kingdom, January 2026), Petteri Orpo (Finland, January 2026), and the planned upcoming visit of Friedrich Merz (Germany, February 2026) \u2013 can largely be interpreted as a tactical reaction to Trump\u2019s recent actions toward Europe rather than a sustainable strategic shift in these countries\u2019 perceptions of China.<\/p>\n
Regarding the current atmosphere of Europe\u2013China relations, it can be stated that with the return of Trump\u2019s aggressive policy, including the imposition of extensive tariffs, the threat of 100 percent tariffs against Canada and the United Kingdom should these countries reach agreements with China, as well as pressure on Europe for complete security-economic alignment with the United States, many European governments have concluded that their excessive dependence on the United States has turned into a strategic risk for them.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, it appears that the European Union, following the relative failure of its efforts to strengthen its relations with Beijing in 2025, particularly after China tightened restrictions on the export of rare mineral elements in the autumn of 2025, has now inclined toward a risk-management strategy while maintaining open channels for engagement.<\/p>\n
In such an environment, China, as the primary target of the United States\u2019 aggressive policy, has precisely capitalized on this vulnerability of the European parties and, by inviting European leaders and accompanying their large trade delegations, simultaneously conveys two messages to Washington and European capitals: first, it signals to the United States that in the event of a worsening trade and technology war with Washington, Beijing possesses the capability to provide substitution in certain significant areas by leveraging Europe\u2019s capacity; and it warns Europe that if they enter into a bilateral trade war with Washington, China can be a reliable partner to compensate for potential gaps they may face.<\/p>\n
Beijing\u2019s Strategic Outlook toward the European Union<\/strong><\/p>\n Under such conditions, examining Beijing\u2019s strategic outlook toward the European Union also appears necessary; from the perspective of Xi Jinping, the leader of China, and the country\u2019s diplomatic apparatus, the European Union possesses three key characteristics:<\/p>\n Accordingly, Beijing\u2019s strategy toward Europe has always been a combination of hard and soft strategies. While offering major trade incentives to pragmatic European countries, including Spain, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, and Serbia, Beijing has exerted a form of targeted and fully managed pressure on countries such as Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and, to some extent, Germany and France.<\/p>\n As recent positions of Chinese officials indicate, Beijing in 2026 is intensifying this strategy and seeks to divide Europe into three distinct camps:<\/p>\n \u2013 The pragmatic and trade-oriented camp (Ireland, Spain, Italy, Austria, Hungary)<\/p>\n \u2013 The hesitant and balancing camp (Germany, France, the Netherlands)<\/p>\n \u2013 The value-oriented and security camp (the Baltic states, Poland, and to some extent the Scandinavian countries)<\/p>\n In the meantime, it appears that the European Union continues to analyze China as an actor characterized by three features: partnership, competition, and systemic rivalry. The concept of partnership includes climate issues, renewable energy, and certain supply chains, including those for batteries and solar panels. Its competitive domains are concentrated in green industries, electric vehicles, and digital technologies. The concept of systemic rivalry largely refers to Beijing\u2019s indirect support for Moscow in the Ukraine war, control over the export of strategic items, and influence over Europe\u2019s critical infrastructure, in the context of competition and major-power equations in the international system.<\/p>\n However, since late 2025, and particularly after the intensification of Trump\u2019s trade war, it appears that the prioritization of European countries, even if at tactical levels, has changed, based on which these countries lack the capacity to confront both the United States and China simultaneously; therefore, many European capitals now believe that a bilateral trade war with Beijing, concurrent with the escalation of ongoing tensions with Washington, would in practice be unbearable for Europe\u2019s fragile economy. For this reason, even previously hardline figures such as von der Leyen adopted a milder tone regarding China at the 2026 Davos meeting and even spoke of the possibility of \u201cexpanding trade and investment with Beijing.\u201d<\/p>\n Regarding the future of China\u2013European Union relations, three scenarios are conceivable: a managed and volatile engagement scenario; a pessimistic scenario involving escalation of bilateral tensions with China simultaneously with U.S. pressures; and finally an optimistic scenario involving the possibility of reaching a minimal agreement with both sides.<\/p>\n Accordingly, if the current situation continues, Europe\u2019s trade with China will persist at high levels, but will face increasing obstacles. Regular high-level dialogues between the two sides will, of course, continue without noticeable progress, and the instrumental use of China by Europeans to counter U.S. pressure will remain on the agenda.<\/p>\n In this context, the first scenario is based on the principle that relations between the parties will neither warm nor reach a complete rupture; however, in the second scenario, should Beijing intensify the use of the rare mineral restriction tool in its interactions with Europe or make its support for Russia more explicit, while Trump simultaneously imposes heavy tariffs on European goods, Europe will be compelled to make a difficult choice, which will likely entail a greater inclination toward Washington at the cost of losing European values and bearing other heavy costs, including economic recession and inflation in the energy sector.<\/p>\n In the third scenario, which encompasses a more optimistic environment, achieving a temporary agreement in the fields of rare minerals, electric vehicles, and certain green standards, accompanied by a reduction of tensions in Ukraine, will be placed on the agenda, allowing Beijing to play the role of a \u201cresponsible mediator\u201d in these international equations. The realization of this scenario naturally requires considerable flexibility from both sides, which, given Washington\u2019s radical performance in all domains, especially during the Trump era, does not appear highly probable.<\/p>\n Overall, it appears that China\u2013EU relations in 2026\u20132027 can be likened to \u201ccautious relations between two trade partners in pre-crisis conditions,\u201d rather than a strategic alliance or an all-out confrontation.<\/p>\n Today, although Europe needs China to mitigate Washington\u2019s blows, it still does not trust Beijing; on the other hand, China also needs Europe to prevent further isolation vis-\u00e0-vis the United States, yet it does not practically perceive within itself the will to change its behavior to meet European expectations fully. The result of this contradiction is the formation of relations filled with controlled tensions, short-term tactical agreements, and continuous efforts to preserve diverse options; an environment that Beijing has termed \u201corderly and equal multipolarity,\u201d and that Brussels refers to as a \u201crisk-balancing strategy.\u201d<\/p>\n This text was translated using artificial intelligence and may contain errors. If you notice a clear error that makes the text incomprehensible, please inform the website editors.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Strategic Council Online \u2013 Opinion: In recent years, relations between China and the European Union, particularly from the second half of 2025 to the beginning of 2026, have entered a new phase that can be described as a form of \u201ccautious and pragmatic engagement,\u201d one that is founded more on mutual non-harm than on deep strategic advancements.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":419544,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[13268,17,13427,12726],"tags":[13227,32842,15744,12740,13454,27043,12872,12870],"class_list":["post-419562","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-note","category-politics","category-strategic-perspective","category-10-en-2","tag-china-en-2","tag-china-eu-relations","tag-economic-relations","tag--en","tag-european-union-en","tag-hamed-vafaei"],"yoast_head":"\n\n