The United States’ unilateral withdrawal from key agreements (such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), the failure to extend New START, and the announcement of policies prioritizing “deterrence against two peer competitors” signal a transition from multilateralism to a transactional and unilateral approach.<\/p>\n
The US program for extensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal\u2014including new low-yield warheads and advanced delivery systems\u2014not only disrupts strategic equilibrium but also sends a perilous message to other actors: “Arm for supremacy, not for stability.”<\/p>\n
These policies, coupled with the expansion of the nuclear umbrella to regional allies and the lowering of the threshold for nuclear use, undermine international legal frameworks and normalize arms racing.<\/p>\n
Risks Posed by the New Nuclear Competition to the Non-Proliferation Regime<\/strong><\/p>\n The simultaneous emergence of China as a rapidly expanding nuclear power and Russia’s continued modernization and nuclear maneuvers\u2014viewed in light of Trump’s policies in this arena\u2014has ushered the world into a dangerous phase of “multipolar nuclear competition.”<\/p>\n This development targets the pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, as it first increases the incentive for nuclear-threshold states to pursue atomic weapons under the guise of “independent deterrence.”<\/p>\n Second, the erosion of arms control agreements\u2014such as the expiration of New START\u2014weakens patterns of verification and transparency, creating space for unilateral and destabilizing actions.<\/p>\n Third, the focus of major powers on “damage limitation” and graduated response options lowers the threshold for nuclear weapons use and heightens the risk of unintended escalation toward nuclear employment. In such an environment, the fundamental principles of the NPT\u2014namely disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use\u2014face selective interpretations and normative erosion.<\/p>\n Solutions to Deter Nuclear Powers from Escalating Competition<\/strong><\/p>\n To avoid plunging into the abyss of atomic instability, nuclear powers must resist the temptation of “quantitative superiority” and focus on risk-reduction mechanisms.<\/p>\n In this regard, first, the urgent revival of bilateral and multilateral strategic dialogues\u2014even in informal formats\u2014is essential for clarifying doctrines and preventing miscalculations.<\/p>\n Second, agreement on “safety protocols” concerning emerging technologies (artificial intelligence, cyber, space) can prevent the dangerous integration of these capabilities with nuclear arsenals.<\/p>\n Third, strengthening regional non-proliferation regimes and establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones\u2014particularly in West Asia\u2014can provide a model for confidence-building.<\/p>\n Finally, a return to the principle of “deterrence sufficiency” rather than “absolute supremacy,” coupled with the acceptance of verifiable limitations on strategic arsenals, could steer competition toward the joint management of threats.<\/p>\n The United States and the Zionist Regime: Two Centers of Nuclear Threat<\/strong><\/p>\n The United States, possessing the world’s largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal, maintaining a policy of “not ruling out first use,” and deploying tactical nuclear weapons at geopolitically sensitive locations, operates as the foremost nuclear threat to global stability.<\/p>\n This approach not only transforms deterrence into an offensive instrument but also establishes a dangerous precedent for other actors.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, the Zionist regime, with an estimated arsenal of 90 to 400 nuclear warheads, non-membership in the NPT, and rejection of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, constitutes a blatant violator of non-proliferation norms.<\/p>\n Relying on Washington’s unconditional support, this regime has not only remained exempt from international accountability but, through repeated threats against the region’s peaceful nuclear programs, has transformed itself into a destabilizing factor in the world’s most sensitive geopolitical flashpoint.<\/p>\n The continuation of this situation undermines the legitimacy of the NPT regime and increases the incentive for regional states to pursue alternative security options\u2014including atomic weapons.<\/p>\n Strategic Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n The global nuclear order stands at the threshold of a historic turning point. A return to stability requires the United States to move beyond unilateralist policies, for nuclear powers to accept their special responsibility in pursuing gradual disarmament, and for multilateral diplomacy to be revitalized to manage strategic competitions.<\/p>\n Without immediate action, the world will not only witness the complete erosion of the non-proliferation regime but also face a significantly heightened probability of limited nuclear conflicts\u2014with catastrophic global consequences.<\/p>\n The preservation of international peace and security today, more than ever before, hinges upon collective wisdom, commitment to international law, and the prioritization of diplomacy over military posturing.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" SCFR Online \u2013 Report: Washington, which once regarded itself as the architect of the non-proliferation order, has now\u2014through shifts in its strategic doctrines in this domain\u2014become the primary factor in the decline of that very order.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":419944,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[12,13427,12726],"tags":[21679,45864,45870,45857,45871,17246,45868,45858,45859,18476,45861,45862,45863,42357,45865,23709,45869,25223,45866,45867],"class_list":["post-420000","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-defense-security","category-strategic-perspective","category-10-en-2","tag-arms-control","tag-artificial-intelligence-and-nuclear-weapons","tag-geopolitical-instability","tag-global-security","tag-gradual-disarmament","tag-iaea-en","tag-low-yield-warheads","tag-multilateral-diplomacy","tag-new-nuclear-competition-and-us-policies","tag-new-start","tag-npt-treaty","tag-nuclear-arsenal-modernization","tag-nuclear-china-and-russia","tag-nuclear-non-proliferation-regime","tag-nuclear-weapon-free-zones","tag-strategic-deterrence","tag-threshold-for-nuclear-weapons-use","tag-us-first-policy","tag-west-asia-and-nuclear-security","tag-zionist-regime-and-nuclear-program"],"yoast_head":"\n