Sajjad Samani \u2013 Expert on regional affairs<\/p>\n
The first test; the confrontation of “political commitments” with “field realities”<\/p>\n
The most important dilemma facing the Makkah Pact lies not in the text of the agreement, but in the differing “threat perception” of its members. Saudi Arabia considers the Persian Gulf, Yemen, and the Red Sea as its frontline of security and views its energy infrastructure as its most vulnerable point; Turkey is simultaneously engaged in the files of Syria, Iraq, the South Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean, and its rivalries with Greece and the European Union define different priorities for it; and Pakistan has focused its attention on its eastern borders (India and Kashmir) and western borders (Afghanistan and Taliban developments). This inherent difference in threat perception, and developments in Yemen, have confronted the Makkah Pact with a serious challenge in its first field test.<\/p>\n
The recent developments in Yemen and Ansarullah’s retaliatory attacks on Saudi energy facilities in response to Riyadh’s war against Yemen are precisely the point of friction. The Pakistani Defense Minister’s announcement regarding the possibility of activating the mutual defense clause, followed by Islamabad’s diplomatic retreat on September 10 (emphasizing no decision for immediate military response), revealed the “gap between political commitment and operational capacity.” Pakistan in practice faces a multi-layered dilemma: on one hand, commitment to Riyadh and the need for Saudi financial support; on the other hand, complex geopolitical relations with Iran, which is its direct neighbor; and thirdly, India’s sensitivities, which views any Pakistani military rapprochement with the Arab bloc with skepticism.<\/p>\n
But behind this caution lies a more important reality: Pakistan and Turkey have absolutely no desire to test the Axis of Resistance. Both countries know that Iran, as an influential actor in the region, can help establish peace and resolve conflicts. The experience of recent years has shown that tension with Iran not only imposes heavy costs on regional countries but also blocks diplomatic solutions. Pakistan and Turkey are well aware that the Axis of Resistance plays a determining role in developments in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and ignoring this reality dooms any effort for regional stability to failure. Activating the Makkah Pact in confrontation with the interests of this front not only imposes heavy costs on Islamabad and Ankara but also blocks diplomatic solutions. Therefore, the first dilemma of the Makkah Pact is this: does this structure, in the face of a crisis, have the capability to transform “verbal solidarity” into “joint military action,” or will it remain limited to a club for information exchange and logistical support?<\/p>\n
The history of regional alliances also shows that differences in national interests usually lead to the weakening of collective commitments. The Saadabad Pact (1937) between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, or the Baghdad Pact (1955), both collapsed due to conflicting interests of members and external pressures. The Makkah Pact will meet a similar fate if it cannot create clear mechanisms for managing internal disagreements.<\/p>\n
China’s uncertain influence<\/p>\n
In circumstances where the members of the Makkah Pact face challenges in filling their deterrence and economic vacuums, the “Chinese variable” is present in this equation as one of the global actors.<\/p>\n
China, which is considered Saudi Arabia’s largest trade partner and Pakistan’s economic-military guarantor, can be active in both the hardware sector (supplying advanced drones, defense systems, and developing joint defense industries between Turkey and Pakistan) and the software sector (economic and diplomatic guarantees to counter Western pressures). However, Beijing still has no desire to enter a classical military alliance directly and is more seeking to guarantee energy security and “Belt and Road” routes in the Persian Gulf. China knows that direct entry into Persian Gulf security equations would place it in confrontation with the United States, and this is not compatible with Beijing’s strategy of “development without confrontation.”<\/p>\n
Therefore, China’s role in this pact can be defined not as the “main architect,” but as a “limited but influential guarantor.” Beijing prefers to increase its influence through arms sales, economic investments, and diplomatic mediation (such as the Riyadh-Tehran agreement in March 2023), without formally entering a military alliance. This approach allows China to maintain good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran and protect its economic interests in the region.<\/p>\n
Conclusion; the risk of the Makkah Pact drifting toward disrupting security<\/p>\n
The Makkah Pact should not be read as a “regional NATO” or merely an instrument for filling the vacuum of the “US security umbrella”; rather, this pact could mark the beginning of a “high-risk transition era.”<\/p>\n
If the three members of the pact do not exercise caution and cannot manage dilemmas such as differing threat perception, the complexities of regional relations, and operational limitations, this pact will transform into its opposite, namely a disruptor of security, instead of strengthening security. The escalation of tensions, the blocking of diplomatic solutions, and the transformation of the Persian Gulf into an arena of arms competition are the natural results of this transformation. In such a scenario, the Makkah Pact, instead of creating deterrence, becomes an instrument for legitimizing unilateral military actions and traps member countries in a vortex of tensions whose control is beyond their own grasp.<\/p>\n
And in the meantime, the only actors who benefit from this situation will be the United States and the Israeli regime. The continuation of insecurity in the Persian Gulf provides a pretext for justifying Washington’s military presence in the region and makes the sale of American weapons justifiable. Simultaneously, the focus of Islamic countries on intra-regional rivalries marginalizes the Palestinian issue and allows the Israeli regime to continue its expansionism without political cost. America benefits from regional insecurity, because this insecurity perpetuates the Persian Gulf countries’ dependence on Washington’s security umbrella and prevents the formation of an independent regional bloc.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the success of the Makkah Pact depends not on the number of members or the volume of weapons, but on the ability of members to intelligently manage differences, maintain diplomatic channels with actors such as the Axis of Resistance, and avoid falling into a trap whose benefits accrue only to regional rivals. If the members of the Makkah Pact cannot emerge honorably from these initial tests and, instead of deterrence, fuel the escalation of tension, they will not only have failed to secure their own security but will have become an unwanted instrument in the hands of the United States and the Israeli regime.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
SCFR Online – Opinion: The Makkah Pact, signed on August 7, 2026, between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, is more than an answer to geopolitical vacuums; in practice, it faces a “deterrence dilemma” and “differing threat perception.” While this pact symbolizes a transition toward regional self-reliance, its first field tests and the complexities of relations with regional actors will determine its real meaning.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":421822,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[12,13268,12726],"tags":[49032,29331,31601,48382,18317,43736,49033,49031,49030,13267],"class_list":["post-422398","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-defense-security","category-note","category-10-en-2","tag-chinas-role-in-the-makkah-pact","tag-iran-pakistan-relations-en","tag-iran-turkey-relations","tag-makkah-pact","tag-persian-gulf-security-en-2","tag-regional-deterrence","tag-sajjad-samani","tag-saudi-arabia-turkey-and-pakistan","tag-the-makkah-pact-and-the-deterrence-dilemma","tag-yemen-ansarullah"],"yoast_head":"\n