Abbas Daraei \u2013 Expert on West Asian Affairs<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia’s behavior cannot be explained merely by a fixed alliance with America or a possible direct confrontation with Iran. The US and Israeli regime war against Iran and the intensification of the conflict in Yemen have compelled Riyadh to strike a balance between sole reliance on Washington’s military power, protection of vital infrastructure, prevention of the war’s expansion, and preservation of its own economic development programs. Saudi Arabia still needs America, but at the same time it seeks to reduce the cost of complete dependence on a single foreign patron.<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia’s economy; resilient but vulnerable<\/strong><\/p>\n One of the outcomes of the recent crisis has been the exposure of the gap between Saudi Arabia’s financial capacity and the physical vulnerability of its economy. The Atlantic Council report, in a hypothetical stress test, has examined a complete halt of Saudi oil exports until the end of 2026. According to this scenario, approximately 75 billion dollars of oil export revenue and 203 billion riyals of the Saudi government’s oil revenues would be lost; however, financial reserves, foreign assets, borrowing capacity, and the relatively low ratio of government debt to GDP can prevent the immediate transformation of the shock into a financial crisis.<\/p>\n But the same report warns that Saudi Arabia’s economy may face an “infrastructure and geopolitical shock” before “financial failure.” Oil production has declined from about 10.9 million barrels per day in February to 6.2 million barrels per day in August, and the east-west pipeline, designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, had an operational capacity of about 4 to 5 million barrels per day before the September 10 and 11 attacks; therefore, Riyadh has the financial resources to withstand part of the shock, but it cannot fully replace a damaged refinery or pipeline with money.<\/p>\n Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability chain<\/strong><\/p>\n The intensification of Ansarullah’s attacks has increased this vulnerability further. Published reports speak of the expansion of missile and drone threats against Riyadh, Yanbu, Taif, and southern areas, as well as increased pressure on shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. The International Crisis Group report also considers the US and Israeli regime war against Iran as one of the factors behind the renewed intensification of the conflict on the Yemen front and emphasizes that Ansarullah’s attacks have increased pressure on Saudi oil exports and shipping.<\/p>\n As a result, the Persian Gulf, Saudi territory, the east-west pipeline, and the Red Sea have become a single security chain. The alternative route to Hormuz is also not immune, and the “Responsible Statecraft” website argues that attacks on oil facilities, pipelines, and export routes have shown that Saudi Arabia’s sole reliance on American power does not necessarily mean Washington’s ability to prevent any attack.<\/p>\n Washington’s guarantee; real support or ambiguous?<\/strong><\/p>\n In these circumstances, Marco Rubio’s statements about America’s adherence to defense commitments toward Saudi Arabia are important for Riyadh, but the scope of this commitment is not clear. Rubio said Washington “will fulfill its commitments,” but did not say that in the event of the crisis’s escalation, America would enter the war directly. Analyses by the Persian Gulf Studies Center and Chatham House also distinguish between military support and direct entry; US support can include equipment, intelligence, satellite imagery, operational planning, and defense reinforcement.<\/p>\n Here, the gap between “reliable security” from Riyadh’s perspective and “sufficient support to maintain the balance” from Washington’s perspective becomes apparent. On the other hand, “Responsible Statecraft” believes that the “America First” approach drives regional partners toward reducing dependence on a foreign power.<\/p>\n Saudi Arabia between Washington, Ankara, Islamabad, and Beijing<\/strong><\/p>\n The establishment of the Makkah Joint Defense Pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey is important in this same framework. This pact is not a substitute for the security alliance with America, but it can add a complementary layer to Riyadh’s security. The International Crisis Group also considers the Red Sea arrangements and the R4 group, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan, as part of a more diverse security structure around the Red Sea.<\/p>\n China is another complementary option. “Responsible Statecraft” argues that the pressure of war can bring Riyadh and Beijing closer; but this does not mean a complete replacement of America, rather it is because China simultaneously has relations with Iran and the Persian Gulf countries and can play a complementary role in economy, technology, and diplomacy. In this way, Saudi Arabia can create a kind of “security multilayering” in which America remains the main source of military support, Pakistan and Turkey remain regional partners, and China remains an economic and diplomatic partner.<\/p>\n Iran’s diplomatic opportunity<\/strong><\/p>\n For Iran, this situation can create an opportunity to redefine relations with Riyadh. The common point of the two countries is the necessity of preventing the war from spilling over into energy facilities, shipping routes, and the regional economy. Therefore, dialogue about the security of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, protection of energy infrastructure, non-targeting of civilian facilities, and crisis management can, alongside geopolitical competition, become an area of common interests.<\/p>\n This approach is more important in circumstances where Saudi Arabia is assessing the limitations of the US security guarantee. Riyadh may still rely on Washington, but the experience of attacks on its territory and infrastructure has shown that the deterrent power of a foreign ally is not necessarily identical to the ability to prevent all war costs for a regional partner.<\/p>\n Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s behavior must be understood within the framework of a multifaceted policy: maintaining the alliance with America, developing regional security arrangements, preventing the Yemen war from becoming attritional, protecting the economic program, and expanding ties with China and other powers. This approach does not necessarily mean distancing from Washington, but rather an attempt to reduce the risk of complete dependence.<\/p>\n For Iran, the most important message of this development is that the gap between “America’s security commitment” and “Saudi Arabia’s real security” can become an arena for diplomacy. The recent crisis has increased Riyadh’s incentive for security diversification and maintaining a communication channel with Tehran; in such circumstances, the sustainable security of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea has become more dependent than ever on regional mechanisms and dialogue among the main powers.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" SCFR Online – Opinion: Riyadh, amid the Iran war, Yemeni pressure, and ambiguous Washington guarantees, has turned to flexible balancing in order to both preserve its security and increase its bargaining power.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":422565,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[12,13268,12726],"tags":[49399,49400,49402,49406,49401,49405,13297,23596,49404,49403],"class_list":["post-422615","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-defense-security","category-note","category-10-en-2","tag-abbas-daraei","tag-analysis-of-saudi-arabias-behavior","tag-flexible-balancing","tag-iran-saudi-diplomacy","tag-iran-america-and-yemen","tag-makkah-joint-defense-pact","tag-persian-gulf-security","tag-red-sea-en-2","tag-security-multilayering","tag-us-security-guarantee"],"yoast_head":"\n