Siroos\u00a0Abbasi \u2013 Expert on West Asian Affairs<\/p>\n
The parliamentary elections of October 27, 2026, in the Israeli regime did not lead to the formation of a clear majority in the Knesset. According to the final results, the Likud Party led by Benjamin Netanyahu won 27 seats, his supporting coalition 53 seats, and the opposition bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot 48 seats. The two Arab political currents also won a total of 19 seats. Thus, neither of the two main blocs reached the threshold of 61 seats to form a cabinet.<\/p>\n
Following these developments, Isaac Herzog, the president of the Israeli regime, assigned the mandate to form a cabinet to Eisenkot on November 8. Eisenkot faces several difficult paths to form a cabinet: forming a minority cabinet with external reliance on Arab parties, gaining the support of Orthodox parties, reaching an agreement with part of the Likud representatives, or moving toward a national unity cabinet. Each of these options requires retreating from the declared positions of some parties. In the event of failure, there is also the possibility of assigning the mandate to Netanyahu or moving toward new elections.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, Netanyahu remains the prime minister of the incumbent cabinet and is responsible for managing executive and security affairs. Therefore, the deadlock in forming a new cabinet does not mean the creation of a power vacuum or a halt in security decision-making; however, the continuation of the caretaker cabinet can reduce the political legitimacy and maneuvering power of the cabinet in costly decisions.<\/p>\n
The war against Iran and the difficulty of reaching an agreement<\/strong><\/p>\n At the regional level, the war that began with the joint attacks of the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran on February 28, 2026, has turned into an attritional confrontation after periods of ceasefire and negotiations. The June memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States also effectively collapsed after a few weeks with America’s breach of commitment and the resumption of conflicts, and effectively expired in August. In such circumstances, the two sides, despite the continuation of indirect contacts, have not yet reached an agreement.<\/p>\n The Strait of Hormuz also remains one of the most important variables of this confrontation. Iran’s ability to influence the security of shipping and energy flows, alongside the economic and military costs of the war’s continuation for America and regional countries, has affected the range of choices of the parties. Therefore, the issue is not merely Iran’s nuclear program, but also the formation of arrangements to end the war and redefine the regional security balance.<\/p>\n The strategic issue of West Asia<\/strong><\/p>\n The most important strategic issue of West Asia in the current circumstances is how to end the war against Iran or prevent it from turning into a long-term and attritional confrontation. In the early stages of the war, the main objective of America and the Israeli regime was to overthrow the government and even disintegrate Iran; but the continuation of conflicts showed what a costly mistake these two had made.<\/p>\n Now the main issue is the ratio between military achievements, the costs of continuing the war, and the ability of the parties to impose their desired political and security arrangements. On one hand, America and the Israeli regime seek to limit Iran’s deterrence capability and strategic capacities; on the other hand, Iran tries to increase the cost of continuing the confrontation for the opposing side by strengthening its defense and missile capabilities and using geopolitical levers, and to prevent the imposition of any undesirable agreement.<\/p>\n In this framework, the Strait of Hormuz is of particular importance. Any sustained disruption in energy transit can expand the scope of the war from the military level to the global economy and involve energy-consuming countries and great powers in its consequences more than before. Therefore, the future of the war does not depend solely on the military capability of the parties; it also depends on the capacity to bear costs, regional coalitions, and the management of economic consequences.<\/p>\n The effects of the Israeli regime’s political deadlock<\/strong><\/p>\n The political deadlock of the Israeli regime can affect the course of the war in two ways. First, the continuation of the caretaker cabinet led by Netanyahu means that the authority for military-security decision-making remains in the hands of the incumbent cabinet. Therefore, Netanyahu can structurally still make decisions about military developments in coordination with Washington. However, the lack of a stable parliamentary majority and the uncertainty of his political future may increase the problems and cost of long-term and high-risk decisions. Also, internal disagreements over the political and military responsibilities of the war can affect the level of consensus of elites and public opinion regarding the continuation of operations.<\/p>\n Second, the war and security threats can become a factor for the rearrangement of the internal political atmosphere. In emergency conditions, pressure for the formation of a national unity cabinet or the suspension of political differences increases. The experience of forming an emergency cabinet after the October 7, 2023 attacks also shows that a security crisis can drive political rivals toward temporary cooperation. From this perspective, the renewed intensification of the war may, instead of immediately limiting Netanyahu’s maneuvering power, provide the ground for increasing pressure on opponents and the formation of an emergency agreement among them.<\/p>\n Of course, this possibility should not be considered a definitive motivation for Netanyahu to restart the war. Such a decision depends on military assessment, Washington’s position, Iran’s response capacity, and regional and international costs. However, the existence of different political interests between the incumbent cabinet and its rivals can affect the way the cost-benefit of military options is assessed.<\/p>\n The possibility of change in the Israeli regime’s war approach<\/strong><\/p>\n In the event of the formation of a cabinet led by Eisenkot, expecting an immediate and fundamental change in the Israeli regime’s security policy toward Iran is not realistic. Eisenkot has a background in military command, and his political current was formed with the aim of preserving the security of the Israeli regime and confronting strategic threats. Therefore, the main difference between him and Netanyahu should not necessarily be reduced to a difference in the principle of confronting Iran.<\/p>\n The possible difference can manifest more in the manner of managing the war, the degree of reliance on coordination with America, prioritizing the reconstruction of military capacities, and the manner of defining post-war political objectives. The new cabinet may, compared to Netanyahu’s cabinet, attach greater importance to reducing regional tensions and rebuilding relations with Western allies; but this will not necessarily mean abandoning military, intelligence, or sabotage pressure against Iran.<\/p>\n On the other hand, if Eisenkot comes to power with a fragile coalition dependent on multiple parties, internal disagreements can limit his freedom of action in military decisions. In contrast, the formation of a national unity cabinet with the participation of Likud may provide greater political consensus for the continuation of hardline security policies.<\/p>\n The link between the Israeli regime’s internal developments and Iran’s and America’s calculations<\/strong><\/p>\n The determining point is that the Israeli regime is not the sole decision-making actor in the war. Washington possesses broader military and diplomatic capacity than that regime, and the economic, security, and political costs of the war also directly affect America’s calculations. Therefore, even if the Israeli regime’s cabinet desires the continuation of military pressure, the possibility of its implementation on a large scale will depend on the degree of America’s alignment.<\/p>\n In contrast, if Washington concludes that continuing the war creates more costs than its possible achievements, it may move toward limiting military operations and reaching an agreement. Such a situation can create a distance between the priorities of the Israeli regime’s cabinet and America.<\/p>\n For Iran as well, these conditions are of importance. The political deadlock of the Israeli regime may reduce the coherence of this regime’s decision-making, but it should not be considered alone as a sign of reduced military threat. Tehran is compelled to assess the political developments of the Israeli regime alongside the level of military coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv, regional military movements, and the negotiation process.<\/p>\n Probable scenarios<\/strong><\/p>\n First scenario: Formation of a new cabinet and movement toward tension management<\/p>\n In this scenario, Eisenkot, overcoming the differences among the parties opposed to Netanyahu, forms a new cabinet. Such a cabinet may, in order to consolidate its internal position, reduce political divisions, and rebuild relations with America and Western allies, prioritize the management of regional tensions. In these circumstances, the possibility of greater support for the path of negotiations and an agreement to end the war increases.<\/p>\n However, this scenario does not mean a fundamental change in the Israeli regime’s policy toward Iran. The new cabinet will likely still emphasize limiting Iran’s strategic capabilities and maintaining its security superiority, but may have differences with the previous cabinet in the choice of tools and the timing of actions.<\/p>\n Second scenario: Failure of negotiations and return to the military situation<\/strong><\/p>\n In the event of the failure of the diplomatic process and the Iran-US negotiations, there is a possibility of the resumption of attacks and the expansion of military confrontation. In such circumstances, the political deadlock of the Israeli regime may, instead of creating a limitation, provide the ground for increased pressure to form an emergency or national unity cabinet. Also, Netanyahu may, by emphasizing security threats, try to overshadow internal disagreements with the war situation.<\/p>\n In this scenario, the degree of America’s alignment will be the determining factor. If Washington supports the continuation of operations, the possibility of intensified confrontation increases; but if the American administration seeks to contain the crisis, the possible difference between the two sides can become one of the obstacles to the continuation of the war. Iran’s reaction and its possible consequences for the Strait of Hormuz can also seriously expand the scope of this scenario.<\/p>\n Third scenario: Continuation of attritional war and negotiations without a final agreement<\/strong><\/p>\n In this scenario, neither a comprehensive agreement is formed between Iran and America, nor do the parties move toward a broad and decisive war. The confrontation continues in the form of limited military pressures, deterrent measures, intelligence activities, and intermittent negotiations.<\/p>\n This situation can coincide with the continuation of the political deadlock in the Israeli regime. The caretaker cabinet or a fragile coalition cabinet, due to internal limitations, may avoid entering a broad war, but will still pursue the policy of pressure and deterrence. In such circumstances, the risk of miscalculation and the transformation of a limited encounter into a broad conflict will remain.<\/p>\n Fourth scenario: Formation of a national unity cabinet and continuation of security consensus against Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n Another possibility is an agreement between Eisenkot and part of the ruling current to form a national unity cabinet. The pressure arising from security threats and the necessity of simultaneously managing multiple fronts can provide the ground for such an agreement. In this case, disagreements over the premiership and the composition of the cabinet may temporarily be marginalized, and security decision-making will enjoy broader political backing.<\/p>\n If such a cabinet is formed, the possibility of continuing the policy of pressure against Iran increases; however, the degree of willingness to continue the war or move toward an agreement will still depend on the joint assessment of Washington and Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n Ultimately, the political deadlock of the Israeli regime should be considered a variable affecting the management of the war, not a factor that alone determines its course. In the current circumstances, the main issue of West Asia is how to end the war against Iran and the formation of a new security balance in the region. The political developments of the Israeli regime can affect the timing and manner of this regime’s confrontation with Iran, but the determining variable will still be the ratio between the objectives of America and the Israeli regime, Iran’s deterrence capacity, and the costs of continuing the war.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" SCFR Online \u2013 Opinion: The deadlock in forming a new cabinet in the Israeli regime, simultaneous with the continuation of the atmosphere of military confrontation between Iran and the United States and the relevant diplomatic process, is considered an important variable in West Asian security calculations. Although the political developments of the Israeli regime alone do not determine the fate of the war, they can affect the timing, level, and manner of the continuation of military confrontation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":423079,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[13268,17,13427,12726],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-423096","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-note","category-politics","category-strategic-perspective","category-10-en-2"],"yoast_head":"\n