Arman Roshandel – International Affairs Expert

Analyzing the Gap Between the Ideal of Independence and the Reality of Dependence

The debate over “European defense independence” is no longer merely a Parisian or Brussels slogan; it has become a political necessity for the continent, growing in prominence under the shadow of the war in Ukraine, great-power competition, and doubts about Washington’s commitments.

Nevertheless, a serious gap exists between what European leaders write in strategic statements and what defense industries, national budgets, and decision-making structures actually permit—a gap that will determine the future of continental security.

In recent years, think tanks such as the European Council on Foreign Relations, the Peterson Institute, and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) have repeatedly pointed to this contradiction: Europe wishes to be a “geopolitical power,” yet it still lacks the classical instruments of power, from weapons supply chains to command cohesion.

Speaking of “independence” is easy, but when more than half of the continent’s intelligence capabilities, nuclear umbrella, and a significant portion of its strategic logistics are tied to the United States, independence remains more of an aspiration than a reality.

Grand Statements, an Industry Smaller Than Expected

The European Union, in its official documents, speaks of “increasing defense production capacity,” “industrial synergy,” and “reducing strategic dependencies.” Reports by the European Parliament on the defense industry and support for Ukraine for 2026-2027 carry the same tone: Europe must become faster, more coordinated, and more independent. However, Europe’s industrial structure is fragmented, competitive, and nationally oriented. Each major European country, from France to Germany and Italy, prefers to strengthen its domestic industries rather than integrate into a truly unified European supply chain.

In such an environment, ideas such as a “European Security Council,” discussed in certain circles including the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), reflect concern over the inefficiency of current mechanisms more than they represent an institutional transformation. Europe has yet to reach a consensus on the fundamental question of whether it wishes to complement NATO or serve as an alternative to it. Until a clear answer emerges, defense investments will remain reactive and interim.

Furthermore, financial constraints are an undeniable reality. European economies face slow growth, social pressures, and accumulated debt. Recent assessments by the Carnegie Endowment have shown that attracting foreign investment and reducing technological dependencies encounter structural obstacles. How, under such conditions, can a sustainable defense leap be financed?

The Shadow of the U.S. Elections

If Europe is today debating an “order without America,” it is primarily due to uncertainty in Washington. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has intensified concerns that U.S. security commitments may become more conditional, more costly, or even more limited. Analyses published by the European Council on Foreign Relations and discussions within the European Parliament indicate that many European capitals no longer take the assumption of “permanent and unconditional U.S. presence” for granted.

However, rather than leading to a cohesive leap forward, this concern has sometimes fueled divergent behaviors. Eastern European countries continue to rely on direct ties with Washington and do not view European independence as a reliable substitute for the U.S. security umbrella. In contrast, France emphasizes strategic autonomy more than any other member. Germany, meanwhile, oscillates between its Atlantic commitments and its desire for an independent role.

Consequently, Europe finds itself in a paradoxical situation: on one hand, it wants the United States to remain in NATO and guarantee continental security; on the other, it speaks of “independence.” If this duality remains unresolved, every new crisis will become a test of European cohesion.

A More Independent Europe; A More Realistic Approach Toward Iran?

For Iran, the key question is whether Europe’s policy toward Tehran would become more realistic if Europe genuinely moves toward greater independence. Recent experience has shown that a significant portion of Europe’s policy toward Iran has been shaped by transatlantic coordination.

On issues such as sanctions, the nuclear file, or even regional matters, Europe has often operated within a framework outlined by Washington. However, a truly more independent Europe, should it ever materialize, may be compelled to recalibrate its calculations.

To ensure energy security, manage migration, and address peripheral crises, Europe requires more complex regional engagements. In such a scenario, a purely normative approach toward Iran might give way to an interest-based balancing strategy.

However, realism is essential: even if European independence is achieved, it will be gradual and limited. Institutional structures, security ties, and value-based overlaps with the United States are so deep that a radical shift appears unlikely. Therefore, expecting a sudden transformation in Europe’s policy toward Iran is more an optimistic wish than an analytical projection.

Europe today stands at the midpoint of a mental transition: from a continent that “imported” its security to an actor that must “produce” part of its own security. However, producing security is not achievable merely through issuing statements or establishing new mechanisms. It requires industry, budget, political will, and, most importantly, strategic consensus.

Until these components take shape simultaneously, an “order without America” will be less an imminent reality and more a warning about the fragility of the status quo. Europe may one day be compelled to stand on its own feet, but the gap between the ideal of independence and the reality of dependence remains a decisive distance. This gap will shape the future of continental security and the quality of its engagement with actors such as Iran.

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