Nader Jahani – Expert on European affairs

The Shift in the Balance of Power in Europe

The Ukraine war, now over four and a half years old, has fundamentally transformed Europe’s security order. The most important development in this regard is the shift in Europe’s leadership axis from the east to the west of the continent. Germany, which at the beginning of the war was known for its hesitation and conservatism in sending weapons to Kyiv, has now become Ukraine’s main ally in Europe.

German Foreign Minister Johan Wadephul’s trip to Kyiv on August 22, 2026, his fourth since assuming office, demonstrated Berlin’s deep commitment to supporting Ukraine. With a commitment of 11.6 billion euros for 2027, Germany, alongside France and Britain, has formed the “leadership core” of the volunteer coalition supporting Ukraine.

This new position of Germany has come at a cost to Poland. Warsaw, which considered itself the frontline of Europe’s defense against Russia, has been excluded from the “leadership core” of the volunteer coalition. Disagreements over the transfer of Ukrainian drone technology, as well as historical disputes, have strained Warsaw-Kyiv relations. This fact indicates that the balance of power in Europe is shifting in Germany’s favor, and Poland, which for years considered itself a strategic ally of the United States in Eastern Europe, has in practice been marginalized.

Simultaneously, developments in the Arctic region also indicate a security rearrangement. With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, seven out of the eight Arctic countries are now members of the alliance, and a format known as “Arctic 7” has been established for security cooperation. Interestingly, these cooperations are sometimes pursued without US presence and in response to Trump’s territorial ambitions regarding Greenland.

Beyond Capacity; the Challenging Erosion of NATO in the Era of Prolonged Wars

The concept of “beyond capacity,” which was previously discussed mostly in academic texts, has now become a tangible challenge for US and NATO military forces. A clear example of this situation is the US Navy, which has been placed under unprecedented pressure. The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln has been deployed in the West Asia region for over 270 days, approximately nine months, while the standard US naval deployment is about seven months (210 days). This trend has not been an exception; out of eleven aircraft carrier missions since 2023, eight have remained at sea for eight months or more.

This situation has serious cascading consequences. The extension of missions means increased maintenance needs, which itself disrupts the preparation and deployment cycle of ships. As one analyst has likened it, this situation is like a driver who neglects periodic car servicing; the car works for a while, but sooner or later a heavier cost will be paid.

A significant portion of this pressure is a result of the US and Israeli regime war against Iran, but the Ukraine war has also had a fundamental share in this capability saturation. Analysts have warned that the reduction of US deterrence capability against China and Russia is one of the inevitable consequences of this situation.

In such circumstances, Europe can no longer reliably count on Washington’s security umbrella and is compelled to strengthen its own defense capability. Although the scenario of a Russian attack on NATO is not far-fetched, what is certain is that America’s ability to respond simultaneously to multiple major crises has faced serious limitations.

Future Scenarios; from Deadlock to a New Security Order

With the continuation of the deadlock in Ukraine, three scenarios for the future of Europe’s security order are conceivable. The first scenario is the continuation of the status quo with intensified transatlantic disagreements. The report of the “Anchorage” meeting between Putin and Trump revealed a deep rift between the United States and Europe on how to end the war.

While Europe seeks a military victory over Russia, Washington has no desire for direct and endless engagement and presents itself merely as a “mediator.” This divergence does not mean the immediate collapse of NATO, but it indicates that the Atlanticism of the twentieth century will not endure in its former form.

The second scenario is the intensification of European militarization without reliance on the United States. European countries are increasing their defense expenditures and seeking to develop independent offensive systems and deterrence against Russia. This approach, based on field experiences from Ukraine, emphasizes automated systems, layered defense, and the ability to “withstand an initial attack and then endure.”

However, this scenario faces a serious challenge: the illusion of victory with “wonder weapons” such as AI-powered drones may lead Ukraine toward collapse rather than victory. General Zaluzhnyi, former commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, has expressed doubts about the success of drone warfare and described it as very costly.

The third scenario is the formation of a new security order in Europe centered on Germany and France, with a gradual distancing from traditional NATO structures. In this scenario, Europe moves toward a “European NATO” in which defense cooperation is defined without or with minimal US involvement.

Such a development, although still in its early stages, aligns with current trends, including the gradual withdrawal of the United States from its role as the primary guarantor of European security. The important point is Moscow’s acceptance of the reality that no external power can impose a solution to the Ukraine war. This shared understanding of the nature of the deadlock could pave the way for a new security architecture in Europe; an architecture in which the dominant role of a hegemonic power no longer exists and the balance of power is redefined in a more complex and multi-layered manner.