Houshang Sheikhi – Senior Researcher at the Hekmat Institute for Policy Studies

Given the developments in Syria, the ambiguity of the country’s future is obvious. The possibility of change and transformation in all areas is not far-fetched. Actions are entirely consistent with the ambiguous conditions to the extent that even “Abu Muhammad al-Julani,” the head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group that has become the most powerful armed opposition force in Syria, has explicitly stated that drafting a new constitution may take three years and organizing elections may take four years. In such circumstances, several Western and Arab countries gathered in Riyadh on January 12 to complete the meeting held in Aqaba last December. They spoke about Syria being no place for terrorism and that no violation of sovereignty or attack on the country’s territory should take place.

The Riyadh meeting is a prelude to the upcoming Brussels meeting on January 27, which is on the agenda to discuss easing sanctions on Syria. How to lift the sanctions on the country in order to manage the transition period has become a topic of discussion in Western circles.

Today, Syria, under the shadow of the Golani government, has become a haven for various foreign actors, and we are gradually witnessing the emergence of the potential for internal conflicts and disputes in this country. From the bloody clashes in the north and east of Syria between the SDF and the National Army to the recent rebellion of some armed elements affiliated with Tahrir al-Sham in the countryside of Deir ez-Zor and the area of ​​influence of the al-Aqidat tribe, or the conflicts with an identity origin in the countryside of Latakia, Tartus and Homs, all are serious signs of the actualization of the potential for conflicts in Syria. A country that is made up of different ethnic and religious groups and has changed its flag seven times in the 79 years since its liberation from the French mandate has the capacity for active identity faults and various experiences of mass killings. Therefore, in a situation affected by the actions of external elements, it is possible that the ballot box will not necessarily and easily determine the fate of Syria.

Although Golani has emphasized the benefits of the Saudi development model to Syria, The first foreign trip by the head of foreign relations of Golani’s organization was to Riyadh, regardless of the fundamental differences in the economy, society, and politics in Syria and Saudi Arabia and the impossibility of implementing the Saudi model for Syria, in practice, due to Tahrir al-Sham’s close and extensive ties with Doha, it will not be possible for Syria to follow the Saudi model due to the conflicting interests of Riyadh and Doha in the region and Syria in the future. However, Syria will continue to be a field of competition for Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, against Qatar, and Syria will be important in formulating each country’s political and security equations.

In the context of Western countries active in the Syrian crisis, Golani’s pragmatism in announcing his positions and points of view has naturally been evaluated as in line with their own policies. Tahrir al-Sham’s passivity in the face of the Zionist regime’s occupation of southern and southwestern Syria and its reliance on Qatar’s mediation for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Syrian territory have made this group to be in favor of serving the interests of the West and its allies.

However, at the Riyadh meeting on Syria, it became clear that Western countries’ concerns about the diversity of armed groups and the actions of elements with a history of membership in transnational terrorist organizations, the strengthening of the idea of ​​self-help and self-reliance among diverse Syrian identity groups, as well as the possibility of social uprisings in Syria, make them hesitant to lift the sanctions against Syria. This situation and doubts about Golani’s approach make decision-making ambiguous.

In the current situation, the continuation of the internal crises and conflicts in Syria and the intensification of the interventions of Western and Arab countries on this issue, in addition to consequences such as the creation of new waves of immigration, will cause the growth of terrorist and Takfiri groups, threaten the security of the region, and spread threats outside the region. It is clear that such threats are assessed against the interests of regional and Western countries and in line with the strategic interests of Tel Aviv.

The driver of such a scenario is the Zionist regime with various strategic motives to continue the occupation in the region, which was also one of the important concerns of the Arab countries at the Riyadh meeting; the scenario of dividing Syria into four cantons – Sunni, Druze, Alawite and Kurdish – proposed by Eli Cohen, a member of Netanyahu’s cabinet, to lay the groundwork for making the conflicts within Syria and regional tensions real is analyzable and understandable. This issue and lifting the sanctions on Syria are important for the countries participating in the Syria meeting. It remains to be seen to what extent the interested Western and Arab countries will reach final and definitive decisions in the upcoming meetings on Syria.