Morteza Makki – European Affairs Researcher
Following Russia’s military attack on Ukraine in February 2022, Europeans have adopted a more serious and severe approach against Iran. Before the war, to a large extent, the most critical issue and topic of negotiation between Iran and Europe concerned Iran’s nuclear programs. In this regard, they tried to keep it alive even after Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Although the JCPOA provided no economic benefit to Iran, and U.S. secondary sanctions led to the exit of nearly all European companies from Iran, reducing bilateral relations to a minimum, the European political will was nevertheless to keep the JCPOA alive. Within this framework, meetings were held between Iranian and European delegations. Furthermore, efforts were made both in the late period of Mr. Rouhani’s presidency and during the tenure of the late Mr. Raisi to revive the JCPOA. However, after Russia attacked Ukraine, when Europe claimed that Iran was a military ally of Russia and defined it as a threat to its own security, the nature of Brussels’s relations with Tehran changed.
The events of the fall of 1401 (2022) and thereafter, and the attacks and moves following the Al-Aqsa Storm (the Palestinian operation on October 7th), somewhat complicated Iran-Europe relations and elevated tensions between the parties beyond the level of the nuclear program. Consequently, Iran has effectively become a challenge for the Europeans. Europe has attempted to place Iran in economic and political straits by leveling baseless accusations regarding Iran’s cooperation with Russia or Iran’s internal policies and the issue of the Axis of Resistance. Moreover, following the developments in Gaza, the Hamas movement has faced extensive political and military pressure. In Lebanon, the Israeli regime martyred Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and also targeted the third and fourth ranks of the Hezbollah movement. In Syria, we witnessed the fall of Bashar al-Assad. All these developments caused the Europeans to align with America and the Israeli regime. With a misguided perception of Iran’s economic, political, and security weakness, their demands from Iran effectively became the same as those of America and the Israeli regime. Therefore, the sanctions that Europeans and Americans imposed on Iran are no longer limited to political and economic pressure aimed at encouraging Iran to accept European demands; they are now effectively aimed at changing Iran’s behavior. The positions pursued by the European Troika (Britain, France, and Germany) indicate that as long as Iran does not initiate some form of dialogue and negotiation with America and the fate of enriched uranium at Fordow and Natanz is not clarified, they do not intend to change their behavior towards Iran, and this signifies their lack of independence regarding American policies.
In this context, the question arises: Can Iran utilize opportunities in legal diplomacy, particularly in the European Court of Justice? In response, it should be noted that Iran had previously filed lawsuits at the European Court of Justice in several financial cases, particularly banking matters, and, in some instances, the rulings issued were in favor of Iran. However, these rulings did not have a serious impact or transformation on the nature of Iran’s political and economic relations with Europe. Iran’s problem with Europe is a political one, and as long as this problem remains unresolved, economic issues cannot be resolved in practice.
On the other hand, unlike in the past, Iran has new opportunities to compensate for or reduce the impact of European and American pressures against itself. The type of behavior and policy adopted by China and Russia regarding activating the snapback mechanism and their announcement that returning to this mechanism is irrelevant can, to some extent, create a new space for Tehran to continue its trade and economic exchanges with these two countries and even, to some extent, with India within this space. However, it does not seem that this situation can create the necessary economic openings for Iran. The reality is that the issue of American and European sanctions against Iran has unfortunately now gained international legitimacy, and America easily seizes Iranian ships in international waters and confiscates its assets. In this context, given that Trump adheres to no political or legal rules, one cannot engage with tools of law and politics and cause a change in the behavior of the U.S. government regarding its anti-Iran policies. Also, the openings created by China and Russia do not seem sufficient to create conditions for economic stability in Iran. Therefore, initiatives must be pursued at the regional and global levels to both reduce the intensity of America’s anti-Iran policies and create space for respectful, constructive dialogue aimed at neutralizing sanctions.