Hossein Ahmadi – Expert on International Affairs

During the February 28, 2026 attack alongside the Zionist regime, the United States pursued clear and predetermined calculations. The initial assumption was that by leveraging air and technological superiority, Iran’s political system would collapse within the first few weeks; however, on-the-ground reality tragically diverged from these predictions. Despite sustaining heavy blows to its infrastructure and even senior commanders, Iran not only avoided collapse but also managed—by relying on geography and asymmetric strategies—to respond to the attacks and target US bases in the region. Initial assessments regarding the significant weakening of Iran’s missile and drone arsenal now appear misleading, and Tehran has effectively maintained its capacity to continue the conflict. The lesson learned from this battlefield is that controlling the skies never equates to controlling the ultimate outcome of a confrontation. Washington, with anxiety and hesitation regarding ground troop deployment and without translating air power capability into a decisive victory, has become trapped in a quagmire whose costs grow more burdensome each day.

This situation carries broader implications for the concept of American hegemony. For decades, Washington’s grand strategy was built upon “supremacy”; the belief had been established that America’s unparalleled military capability allowed it to maintain global order and dictate the outcomes of wars across various regions. However, the Iran war demonstrated that the costs of a prolonged conflict are unsustainable for the United States. Unlike the Iraq war, where rapid military victory was achieved and peace was later lost, in Iran even the military phase was not accompanied by complete success. This failure has altered the myth of American invulnerability and its absolute capacity to impose its will.

The New Multipolar Order and the Approach of Emerging Actors

The space created by this deadlock has been rapidly exploited by other major powers to redefine their positions within the global order. China, which has consistently been presented as America’s strategic competitor, has now appeared on the international stage with greater confidence and has demanded concessions from Washington. The serious disruption in energy supply chains resulting from instability in the Strait of Hormuz has compelled Beijing to reassess the security of its major investments—a reassessment that has largely been accompanied by a demanding tone. In contrast, Russia views itself as one of the economic beneficiaries of this crisis, as the significant increase in export prices for oil and gas has yielded substantial profits for the country. Nevertheless, Moscow does not desire the complete collapse of American influence in West Asia, as a balanced Washington presence constitutes part of the complex diplomatic structure that Russia considers necessary for the world’s relatively peaceful development. These differing yet convergent reactions clearly indicate that the world has entered a phase in which power is no longer monopolized by a single pole but is distributed among several major actors, each seeking to tactically exploit crises to advance their long-term objectives.

Alongside these two Eastern giants, other regions and coalitions have also confronted a redefined sense of self. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as an institution fundamentally based on neutrality and consensus (the so-called “ASEAN Way” strategy), responded to the Iran war merely by expressing concern and calling for a ceasefire. Its members, based on national interests and political affiliations, have adopted differing and sometimes contradictory positions—ranging from expressions of Islamic solidarity by Malaysia and Indonesia to prioritization of economic stability by the Philippines and Singapore. This internal dispersion calls into question the effectiveness of regional coalitions in the new order and demonstrates that henceforth, smaller countries will increasingly seek independent agency or “risk hedging” vis-à-vis major powers.

The final and clear message of the war against Iran for American politicians and strategists and their allies is the end of the era of unilateral supremacy and the beginning of an age of mutual containment. In a world where major powers cannot easily impose their will and smaller states can resist them at acceptable costs, sole reliance on classical military deterrence is no longer sufficient. America’s traditional allies have also recognized this reality and are seeking to diversify their security partnerships—a process that accelerates the gradual but inevitable decline of alliances based on a single central guarantor. However, perhaps the greatest cost of this transformation is borne by American and European public opinion, with polls indicating widespread opposition to continuing this approach. Persisting on the current misguided path without strategic redefinition will only mean deepening existing deadlocks and jeopardizing long-term interests. What we are witnessing today in the Persian Gulf and beyond is not a tactical defeat but the erosion of a dominant paradigm and the dawn of a new era in international relations.