Farhad Samiei – US affairs expert

Creating Crisis or a Coherent Doctrine?

Over the past 18 months, the process of the US withdrawal from dozens of international institutions, up to the launching of a war against Iran, has raised the question of whether Washington is building a new order or merely undermining the existing one. On one side of this debate lies the narrative of “crisis as doctrine,” according to which the rules-based order that had endured for about eighty years is coming to an end, and its replacement is not a new structure but chaos as an instrument of US foreign policy. The withdrawal from 66 international organizations, the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and budget cuts to some UN bodies are also interpreted within this framework.

On the other side, the “Trump doctrine” narrative attempts to attribute a common strategic logic to his actions, based on sovereignty, confrontation with China, burden-sharing with allies, and a revision of America’s role in the world. The difference between these two narratives is encapsulated in the question of whether Trump’s behavior is a set of ad hoc and contradictory decisions or governed by a coherent pattern.

Trump’s transactional and sometimes contradictory approach has reinforced the perception that his “doctrine” is nothing but crisis; however, recurring patterns in his foreign policy also indicate that Washington’s behavior cannot be dismissed as merely random. The common thread between these two narratives is that US foreign policy has introduced an unprecedented level of uncertainty and unpredictability into the international system.

Greenland; From Rhetoric to Action

The Greenland case is a clear example for measuring the gap between declared objectives, instruments, and the outcomes of Trump’s foreign policy. In March 2025, Trump promised Greenland’s citizens billions of dollars in investment to create jobs and wealth, while simultaneously threatening European countries opposed to US control over Greenland with 10 to 25 percent tariffs. This approach can be seen as part of a pattern of “coercive bargaining,” in which economic tariffs are transformed into a political lever.

However, the results of this approach diverged from the stated narrative. Denmark’s economic growth since before the COVID-19 pandemic has, on the whole, outpaced that of the United States; therefore, the country that Trump intended to make wealthier by annexing Greenland to the United States has itself had a more favorable economic performance than the United States. The threat to use force to seize Greenland also provoked a strong reaction from European allies and, instead of building trust, increased concerns about Washington’s policies. Trump ultimately backed away from the threat of using military force at the World Economic Forum in Davos. This pattern – aggressive threats, negative reactions, and then tactical retreat – has been repeated in various cases.

Allies; From Partnership to Dependency

Redefining America’s relationship with its allies has been a consistent theme of Trump’s foreign policy. His strategic documents emphasize “partnership, not dependency” and the end of taking US support for granted. The new National Defense Strategy also calls on allies to take control of their own security and prioritizes the defense of US territory and containing China. This approach is consistent with a doctrine in which the United States distances itself from the role of global policeman and seeks to share the security burden with allies.

However, the practical consequence of this policy has not necessarily been to strengthen alliances. America’s traditional allies have concluded that Washington’s foreign policy no longer guarantees their unconditional support, and accordingly, they are redefining their security strategies. The US withdrawal from international institutions and the weakening of multilateral frameworks have also prompted smaller and medium-sized countries to increase risk coverage, arm themselves, and make independent decisions.

The War against Iran; from Narrative to Field Reality

The war against Iran is also one of the most important testing grounds for Trump’s foreign policy. Fox News, months before the attack, promoted the narrative that if the United States did not decisively confront Iran’s leadership, Iran would acquire nuclear weapons. After the war began, the network also supported its continuation by emphasizing military successes and the promise of Iran’s imminent collapse. Laura Ingraham also described opposition to the war as “anti-American,” reducing the debate to a binary of good and evil.

However, the field reality diverged from this narrative. The main objective of the war, namely the overthrow of Iran’s system, was not achieved, while at the same time, strategic oil reserves and a portion of America’s missile defense systems were severely depleted. This gap between media narrative and war outcomes indicates that Trump’s foreign policy faces structural limitations in practice. Consequently, Trump neither fully controls the situation nor has lost control of it, but rather makes decisions in an environment of perpetual uncertainty.

An Emerging Doctrine or Sustained Chaos?

The answer to the dichotomy of “crisis as doctrine” versus “coherent doctrine” should be sought in the combination of these two narratives. On one hand, Trump’s foreign policy exhibits recurring patterns such as emphasis on sovereignty, coercive bargaining, reduced commitments to allies, and prioritization of competition with China; but on the other hand, these patterns lack the strategic coherence of a classical doctrine and are often accompanied by contradictory tactical decisions, sudden retreats, and a gap between rhetoric and action. Therefore, Trump is neither a strategist with a completely clear roadmap nor a mere chaos agent.

US security commitments to allies, withdrawal from some international institutions, and Washington’s increased focus on competition with China could reduce some of the indirect pressures on Iran; however, the approach based on coercive bargaining and unpredictable military threats complicates Tehran’s strategic calculations.

More importantly, the redefinition of America’s role in the world, whether called a “doctrine” or a “crisis,” implies the weakening of an order in which countries to some extent knew the rules of the game. The order now taking shape still lacks clear and established rules and mechanisms for interaction among great powers and emerging powers. In such circumstances, the ability of countries to adapt to the new environment, maintain strategic autonomy, and capitalize on opportunities arising from the redistribution of power will require more than ever precise calculation and strategic acumen.