Hamas’ action in reestablishing relations with Syria has been met with a positive reaction by the Palestinian resistance groups and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
History of relations
Hamas cut ties with Damascus in 2012, some time after the beginning of the Syrian crisis. But what factors caused Hamas to cut ties with Syria is related to the theoretical and ideological origin of Hamas, which is influenced by the views of the Brotherhood. In addition, Hamas’s incorrect analysis and unrealistic assessment of the developments and prospects of the crisis that began in Syria in 2011 were two “effective variables” in cutting off Hamas’ relationship with Damascus and supporting the movement’s opposition groups against the Syrian government.
Since 2017, after holding the elections and the return of Ismail Haniyeh to the political office, Hamas has sought interaction with Syria and reconciliation with Damascus.
In June 2012, the political bureau of Hamas unanimously approved that the movement’s relations with Syria be resumed. Of course, the mediating efforts of Tehran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have not been ineffective in this regard.
Sayed Hassan Nasrallah was among the first people who seriously and officially raised the reconciliation of Hamas with the Syrian government in the past weeks. On August 3, 2012, in a conversation with al-Mayadeen network, he emphasized that “our brothers in Hamas admit that no Arab country has helped this movement and the Palestinian resistance in general” like Syria.
Effective reasons and factors
In the resumption of relations between the Hamas movement and the Syrian government, there are some reasons and factors, three of which are the most important:
One; The destruction of ISIS and “Syria’s passing through the crisis conditions” that it has faced in the past years, as well as the restoration of this country’s position among the Arab and Islamic nations, are the main factors of Hamas’s reconciliation policy with Syria. Today, Syria is in a relatively favorable situation that even the countries that previously supported the opposition and terrorists in Syria, including the UAE, are resuming relations with Damascus and reopening their diplomatic centers in this country. Even the Turkish government, which is kind of at war with Syria, has recently started security talks with Damascus.
When the resistance and standing of the Syrian government forces the major military and political powers in the region and the world, including Saudi Arabia and the United States, to reconsider their anti-Syrian positions, there is no longer any justification for Hamas to cut ties with Syria.
Two; Since 2012, Hamas has relied more on Turkey and Qatar to receive political and economic aid, but these two countries have undergone changes in recent years that have led Hamas to the conclusion that it should not and cannot rely on these two countries anymore.
The intensification of Turkey’s economic problems, Ankara’s compromise policies with Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv’s proposal of some preconditions regarding the closure of offices and the expulsion of Hamas leaders in Turkey, the uncertainty regarding the continuation of Qatar’s political and financial support that may occur with the re-election of the Republicans in the United States and the intensification, the pressures on Doha to end in this context are among these developments.
Three; The “necessity of strategic alliance” of the resistance groups to intensify and continue the fight against the Zionist regime, which is in an inflammatory situation today, is the next variable in this field. The emergence of such factors caused that in the past years, in addition to the will of the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran, they also took important steps to improve the relations between the two sides.
Strategic repercussions
Breaking Hamas’ relations with Syria in the last 10 years was not in the interest of Hamas, Syria and Palestine. Therefore, the resumption of relations between the two sides should be considered an important action with “strategic consequences”, which is not good news for the Zionist regime and Arab compromise governments; Especially when this regime is facing important political, security and social impasses inside. In this regard, it is important to pay attention to the following consequences:
One; Hamas dominates the Gaza Strip and is the most powerful Palestinian organization. From this point of view, the resumption of relations with the Syrian government will help to “strengthen the cohesion and unity of the Islamic resistance” from Syria and Hamas against the Zionist regime.
Two; In a situation where the Zionist regime, following successive defeats by Palestinian groups, has adopted a strategy of maximum pressure in terms of security, political, military and even psychological operations at the international level, in the region and inside the occupied territories against the Palestinian resistance groups and the Islamic resistance, the restoration of relations between Hamas and Syria and the resolution of their differences will lead to “adopting aligned political and field positions” in the field of developments in occupied Palestine, the effects and results of which can soon be seen in the depths of the occupied territories.
Three; The end of the differences between Syria and Hamas and the subsequent “facilitation and acceleration of the process of transferring military and equipment aid” of the Resistance Front through Syria to the Gaza Strip, considering the presence of Hamas in this area, which is not a hidden matter, is the next consequence in this It is the context that is important.
Concluding point
The disagreement between Hamas and Syria and the severing of relations between the two sides in all these years have not been able to create a disturbance in the views of this movement towards the Zionist regime and the cause of the Palestinian nation. Regarding the Palestinian issue, Hamas is still aligned with the Islamic Resistance Front and Iran, and it cannot be doubted. It is for this reason that the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite being dissatisfied with the severing of relations between Hamas and Syria, did not reduce its support for this movement in the past decade, and in line with its “major policies” regarding the preservation and strengthening of the Islamic Resistance Front, despite some differences of opinion continued to support it.
The goals and consequences of restoring relations between Hamas and Syria

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