Nozar Shafiei – South Asia Expert
On May 10, 2025, the India-Pakistan ceasefire agreement, mediated by the United States, was signed. Indian armed forces launched a military attack on Pakistan on May 7, 2025, in response to the Pulwama attack, which triggered the conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi. As tensions between India and Pakistan escalated, many countries took positions, but ultimately, U.S. mediation prevented the situation from worsening.

Analyzing the U.S. position in this crisis, it can be said that the U.S. refrained from taking sides and instead called for restraint. Trump had also emphasized that if a war were to break out between India and Pakistan, the U.S. would cut off trade relations with both countries. This was the U.S.’s strongest stance through the State Department and the President himself regarding the Kashmir crisis.

Whether Trump or another individual is the U.S. president, South Asia remains critically important to American strategic circles. First, the region is adjacent to China, the United States’ most significant future rival. Second, India is one of the key countries balancing against China. Third, the region is part of the Indo-Pacific, a term coined by the Japanese and promoted by the Americans. The Indo-Pacific reflects the formation of new security equations or polarizations at the international level. While terms like “East” and “West” dominated international equations in the past, today, concepts such as the Indo-Pacific have emerged. Thus, this region and its countries—from Sri Lanka to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—hold great importance in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

Among these, Pakistan poses the most significant challenge for the U.S. in the region. Although Pakistan is considered a Chinese ally, the U.S. seeks to pull it away from its strategic partnership with China. Therefore, the U.S. position urging restraint in the Islamabad-New Delhi tensions stems from Washington’s concern that Pakistan might move closer to China and serve as a strategic hub in anti-American equations. Such a scenario could complicate U.S. interests. At the same time, Washington remains hopeful about drawing Pakistan closer.

On the other hand, the U.S. claims to support international peace and security and has had to act cautiously regarding the India-Pakistan crisis. Additionally, the Kashmir dispute involves two nuclear powers, a fact not lost on the U.S.

Finally, it must be noted that the Kashmir crisis has persisted for over 70 years and is deeply rooted. It encompasses three key issues: water, territory, and religion. Thus, resolving Kashmir between India and Pakistan is extremely difficult. Pakistan will continue to seek the partition of the Indian subcontinent until Kashmir joins it. At the same time, New Delhi views Kashmir as an inseparable part of India, believing any partition would trigger India’s disintegration. Hence, the issue holds immense significance for both countries, and the dispute is not easily resolvable. What drives both sides toward crisis management is solely nuclear deterrence. However, as a shrewd actor, India does not want the crisis to escalate beyond control, risking economic growth.

In the future, similar crises will arise in India-Pakistan relations. While Kashmir remains the core issue, other factors could also fuel tensions.

If the Kashmir crisis is to be resolved, several scenarios emerge: the region could join Pakistan, join India, come under formal joint border control, form a larger Kashmir integrating Indian and Pakistani parts, or split into smaller sections divided between the two. However, all these scenarios are highly complex, and even with U.S. mediation, a swift resolution is unlikely.