In his opinion, the United States has been less effective in fostering local conditions that are conducive to a lasting reduction in religious “jihadists’ militancy”. Sam Heller, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations website, responded to our questions.

The text of the written interview is as follows:

Is the danger of religious fundamentalism rising today, compared to the past?

At the outset, allow me to clarify a point on nomenclature: “Salafi-jihadists” or “jihadists” are a specific subset of Sunni Islamist militant, of which the most prominent examples are al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). They hold an ideology called “Salafi-jihadism,” a term they themselves use. They are not representative of the Islamic concept of “jihad”, and my references to “jihadists” and “jihadism” should not be considered a reflection on “jihad” or Islam generally.

The “jihadist” threat is greater today than in the past, but, as I wrote in a recent commentary for International Crisis Group, we need to be careful in how we assess and quantify that threat. “Jihadists” are more numerous and widespread geographically, and they still pose an international terrorist threat, whether for the United States, Europe or Iran. Still, those “jihadists” are primarily fighting in local conflicts, and they have drawn strength in recent years from state failure and divisive civil conflict across the Middle East and North Africa.

Even as “jihadists” are primarily occupied with local conflict, however, Iran and its local allies such as Lebanon’s Hizbullah are also involved in many of those same conflicts. Many “jihadists” thus consider Iran and its partners as among their main, immediate adversaries. Iran is now a focus of “jihadist” enmity worldwide.

Antagonism to Shi’ite Muslims generally has also become more central to “jihadism”. “Salafi-jihadism” has relied on Sunni Salafism’s rejection of religious heterodoxy and “idolatry” to conceptualize a program of violence and revolution. Yet it was al-Qaeda in Iraq’s Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi who initially translated Salafism’s anti-Shi’ism into real, deliberate action and – for both doctrinal and strategic reasons – prioritized violence against Shi’ites. Zarqawi and his successors in Iraq also broadcast that same lethal sectarianism throughout the international “jihadist” movement. Recurring violence in Iraq and conflicts such as Syria’s civil war have further mainstreamed that deadly sectarian hostility among “jihadists”, including in far-flung countries where Iran has no role, or with few or no Shi’ites.

The fracturing of the global “jihadist” movement and al-Qaeda’s loss of intra-movement hegemony is also dangerous for Iran and Shi’ites. Al-Qaeda in Iraq – now the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (ISIS) – targeted Shi’ites in a way al-Qaeda traditionally had not. Now, ISIS’s competition with al-Qaeda for the leadership of the “jihadist” movement gives it a powerful incentive to outbid al-Qaeda by targeting Shi’ites and Iran, including inside Iran itself.

How has the US counter-terrorism policy affected on religious fundamentalism all over the world?

The United States has been reasonably effective at killing and incapacitating “jihadists” worldwide. What the United States has done less effectively is fostering conditions locally that are conducive to a lasting reduction in “jihadist” militancy. That includes supporting and capacitating effective, popular governments that can themselves manage the threat of local “jihadism”. In some instances, the U.S.’s focus on kinetic counterterrorism – killing and capturing “jihadists” – may have actually been counterproductive. A primarily military-security approach to counterterrorism has in some instances stirred popular resentment against the U.S.’s local government partners or crowded out other, nonmilitary elements of U.S. policy that help create resilient local societies.

Are the goals of religious fundamentalism more local or global?

“Salafi-jihadism” has always aimed to topple what “jihadists” consider illegitimate, idolatrous regimes ruling over Muslim peoples, and then erect a utopian Islamic Caliphate ruled by God’s law, as they understand it. Where “jihadists” have differed has been on strategy, including how they have sequenced and prioritized various objectives. This local-global distinction is among these intra-“jihadist” differences. Al-Qaeda has traditionally given precedence to the “far enemy” – the United States – in order to rally Muslim support globally and sap U.S. strength and will. Eventually, al-Qaeda hoped to so weaken the U.S. that it would withdraw its protection from its local client regimes, leaving them vulnerable. As for an Islamic state, al-Qaeda and its preferred “jihadist” theorists mostly reasoned that they could not establish a state before breaking U.S. and “Crusader” power, which would otherwise just destroy whatever “jihadists” build. ISIS, on the other hand, was prepared to skip these intermediate steps and claim territory now for a “jihadist” state, under whose militant banner they would rally the world’s Sunni Muslims. Still, in practice, the distinction between these strands of “jihadism” can be blurred. Most of al-Qaeda’s affiliates fight locally, even as they maintain a transnational worldview and may incubate an “external operations” capacity to launch international terrorist attacks. And though ISIS is occupied mainly with local control, it also directs and encourages international attacks to reinforce its own “jihadist” credibility and to terrorize its enemies.

At the same time, and as I emphasized in my Crisis Group commentary, “jihadists” should not be treated as some uniform, undifferentiated bloc. Al-Qaeda and ISIS as organizations have strategic aims, but many of their rank-and-file fighters are locals fighting in local conflicts, and likely for local reasons. Thus, we need to be careful talking about the goals of “jihadists”. The outlook and motivations of the veteran, transnational cadres are probably very different than Syrians fighting in Syria, or Iraqis in Iraq. These different types of “jihadists” require different policy responses.

How could local and regional negotiations on countering terrorism help to contain this phenomenon?

Negotiations are one of a number of nonmilitary policy options that could help contain “jihadism”. Yet the sort of negotiations most useful in containing “jihadist” militancy may not themselves be centered on counterterrorism.

The first priority should be negotiating to end to the conflicts in which “jihadists” fight. “Jihadists” flourish in contexts of state failure, social division, and war. As Crisis Group has argued, “jihadists” rarely start these wars or even steer them decisively. Rather, “jihadists” opportunistically enter conflicts fought mainly for other, unrelated reasons, even if those “jihadists”’ involvement may make the conflicts more difficult to resolve. Every effort should be made to control or end these conflicts and thus deny “jihadists” conditions conducive to recruitment and militant action.

In some instances, it may also make sense to negotiate with “jihadists” themselves, or with their Islamist militant allies. These groups espouse intolerant or toxic views, but with some, it may be possible to arrive at more limited, functional agreements or understandings that can mitigate or end deadly conflict. The experience of engagement and negotiation can also change these groups, acculturating them to forms of nonviolent politics and separating more pragmatic elements within these groups from inflexible hardliners.

Is it better to deal with extremists with a soft approach or it is better to do it with the hard approach?

An effective policy to combat “jihadist” militancy requires both a “soft” and a “hard” approach, not one or the other. “Jihadism” is a complex, multi-layered phenomenon that demands a similarly complex policy response.

There are undoubtedly some “jihadists” who pose an imminent danger to others and can only be stopped with force. But the number of “jihadists” has grown exponentially over the past two decades, to include not only hardened transnational cadres but also thousands of young men fighting in local wars. It is not realistic or advisable to try to just kill all these people. A smart policy response should aim instead to peel away “jihadist” groups’ auxiliaries and marginal members and to facilitate their demobilization and reintegration into society. The policy must also work to address the social cleavages and grievances that originally motivated many of these fighters, and which allowed veteran cadres to steer these young men towards “jihadist” militancy.

Among those social cleavages is sectarian division. Sectarian polarization is socially deleterious in its own right, but it also empowers the most extreme, militant sectarians, including “jihadists”. In a society split along sectarian lines, “jihadists” will use that division to claim they are the champions of local Sunni Muslims and to try to rally Sunnis to their cause. The policy must avoid reinforcing sectarian division or creating a popular atmosphere of sectarian chauvinism, as opposed to normal sectarian diversity and the positive expression of religious identity.