Barsam Mohammadi – Regional Affairs Expert
These days, any impartial observer who follows developments on the Resistance Front clearly realizes that the Zionist regime’s attempt to separate the Lebanese front from possible Iran–U.S. negotiations is not merely a tactical mistake, but rather a disregard for objective realities on the ground. Hebrew-language media report that the Zionist regime’s army has recommended to the government cabinet that it intensify its attacks in southern Lebanon before any potential agreement, yet the same sources emphasize that this project has thus far failed. The reason lies in the strategic depth of Hezbollah’s connection with Lebanon, the region, and the Axis of Resistance.
To understand why Lebanon cannot be separated from the Resistance Front, one must first understand Hezbollah’s position within Lebanon. Over the past four decades, Hezbollah has become, beyond a military group or political party, an inseparable part of Lebanon’s social, political, economic, cultural, and security fabric. By providing an extensive network of social, healthcare, educational, and post-war reconstruction services, Hezbollah has established a strong social base for itself among Lebanon’s Shiites and Sunnis, and even beyond that, among other segments of Lebanese society, including Christians.
Contrary to prevailing narratives in Western media, Hezbollah has never been an external actor imposed upon Lebanon; rather, it is a phenomenon fundamentally born out of the occupation and crimes of the Zionist regime and itself influenced by popular resistance. Historical experience has demonstrated that whenever a country is subjected to invasion and occupation, resistance movements emerge which, after the end of the occupation, continue their existence due to their effectiveness and public trust. The Lebanese resistance emerged precisely from this necessity and has today become a symbol of steadfastness against aggression.
At the regional level, Hezbollah has played an unparalleled role in creating deterrence against the Zionist regime. In the absence of Hezbollah, Lebanon itself might no longer exist today, and the country could have fallen under the occupation of the Zionist regime years ago. The humiliating defeat of the Zionist regime in 2000 and, subsequently, the collapse of the myth of the invincible army during the 33-Day War of 2006 permanently changed the region’s security equations. For the first time, under circumstances in which regular Arab armies had failed to defeat the regime, a popular movement succeeded in disrupting the balance of power. These achievements, together with Hezbollah’s victories against the Zionist regime’s repeated aggressions against Lebanon in recent years, conveyed to all the nations of the region the message that resistance is possible and victory is attainable.
The fact that the Zionist regime today seeks the destruction of Hezbollah is precisely because of the successful functions and strategic achievements that Hezbollah has attained not only for Lebanon but also for the region. Yet the noteworthy point is that even the military and political officials of the Zionist regime openly speak of their inability to destroy or completely disarm Hezbollah.
In recent days, senior officers of the Zionist regime have acknowledged that “it was clear from the outset that the Lebanon war would not lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament.” This admission, coming from those who have suffered defeat twice over the past forty years, carries profound significance. If the Zionist regime, after the humiliating withdrawal of 2000 and then the 2006 war, and indeed after the events of the past two years and the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and a large number of commanders of the Lebanese resistance, has still failed to bring this movement down, it will not have a promising prospect of achieving that objective today either.
The situation on the Zionist regime’s northern front alone reflects a bitter reality for Tel Aviv. Zionist orientalists openly state that the northern settlements have become detached from the authority of the Israeli regime and that their residents have no confidence in either the cabinet or the army. Hezbollah’s suicide drones have inflicted heavy losses on the Zionist regime’s army, and Zionist commanders still have a long way to go in confronting this threat. A front whose residents have not returned to their homes and where normal life has not resumed is a paralyzing and crisis-generating front for any cabinet within the Zionist regime.
The key point that must not be overlooked is the nature of coordination between the Lebanese front and the Axis of Resistance. This coordination is not a hierarchical and directive relationship, but rather a strategic convergence based on shared interests, threats, and aspirations. With a profound understanding of regional equations and while preserving its operational independence in Lebanon’s domestic arena, Hezbollah, in full coordination with the other pillars of the Resistance Front, considers itself part of any future agreement in the region.
Prominent Zionist analysts have also described a potential Washington–Tehran agreement as highly detrimental to the regime and argue that the only winner in this arena would be Hezbollah. Why? Because any agreement that does not guarantee a ceasefire in Lebanon is an incomplete and unsustainable agreement.
In short, the Lebanese front is inseparable from the Islamic Resistance Front not on the basis of a tactical choice, but because of its profound strategic and field coordination with it. The regime’s effort to sever this connection is an illusory project whose failure even its own officials acknowledge. History will repeat itself once again, perhaps even more decisively than in previous periods. Resistance in Lebanon has become so deeply rooted that separating it from any political or military solution will only harm those who entertain such an illusion. Likewise, any regional agreement that fails to take the Lebanese front into consideration will be an incomplete and unrealistic agreement.
This text was translated using artificial intelligence and may contain errors. If you notice a clear error that makes the text incomprehensible, please inform the website editors.


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