Alireza Samoudi – Faculty Member, Abrar Research Institute

During the Cold War era, China’s perspective on the Persian Gulf and West Asia was shaped by Mao’s viewpoint, supporting liberation movements as a means to establish itself as a formal international actor. However, following the end of the Cultural Revolution, China’s approach shifted toward non-ideological, economic, and commercial matters. In this regard, an international concept known as the “zero enemies” policy has been articulated, which Chinese policymakers have followed in recent years. This policy possesses several important characteristics: notably, Beijing focuses more on diplomatic and economic issues than military affairs. Additionally, China strives to promote multilateralism, avoid unilateralism, and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. This policy—particularly following Xi Jinping’s rise to power and the implementation of the “Belt and Road Initiative”—has doubled the region’s significance for Chinese policymakers.

Furthermore, China’s foreign policy toward Persian Gulf countries can also be analyzed through the concept of “strategic immunization.” As a powerful actor vis-à-vis the United States, Beijing seeks to engage economically, establish relations with all regional actors, and avoid overtly claiming to challenge the dominant power’s authority. In reality, under the umbrella of America’s regional security strategy, China expands its relations with other actors. It must also be noted that nearly 40 percent of China’s energy needs are supplied through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz—a matter of considerable importance for Beijing.

Another key point is that China serves as the most important trade partner for Persian Gulf countries. According to statistics provided through December 2025, the volume of trade relations between China and regional countries has reached $299 billion, accounting for 19 percent of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ trade relations, with India, the United States, and Japan ranking subsequently. In recent years, these economic relations have intensified significantly. In the technology sector as well, many Chinese companies are present in the region, with extensive cooperation occurring in technological domains—to the extent that Chinese chemistry professors teach at Saudi and Emirati universities, and various Chinese companies collaborate with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, particularly in areas such as cloud services.

In the military industries sector, although China lags somewhat behind, its military and arms cooperation with certain regional countries has increased in recent years. While still significantly behind the United States, China has reached agreements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to establish missile and drone production factories. These defense and military collaborations are expanding, though the recent war could introduce changes. An important matter during the wartime period relates to the UAE Crown Prince’s visit to China and his telephone call with Mohammed bin Salman, which led to the articulation of a concept termed “sustainable and participatory security in the Persian Gulf.” China has also been active in mediation discussions; during the Pakistani Foreign Minister’s visit to China, Beijing presented a five-point proposal and, by dispatching a special representative to the region, became intensely active in managing the situation—contrary to initial appearances—because any tension in this region could jeopardize the Belt and Road Initiative.

Another significant issue concerns the UAE’s potential exit from OPEC. Should this coincide with the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, it would hold high importance for China’s energy security. This is because, should the UAE exit these frameworks, transactions using currencies other than the dollar—such as the yuan—could become feasible, contributing to the internationalization of China’s currency and facilitating local currency exchanges. Nevertheless, China has consistently sought to maintain a form of balance among Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Zionist regime.

The implication of this situation for China and the United States in the region is that China’s security role will likely increase gradually. This is because Arab states have concluded that the fundamental “oil-for-security” principle has been compromised and that the United States ultimately prioritizes the Zionist regime. This perception has drawn Saudi Arabia closer to China. Of course, no fundamental change will occur in the short term, as the United States still maintains approximately 50,000 troops in the region, and Arab countries’ defense structures remain dependent on Washington. Therefore, a rapid increase in China’s security cooperation with regional countries in this domain appears unlikely. However, the model of relations in the energy sector will differ, and a “Persian Gulf Energy Community” with Chinese participation could potentially emerge. Additionally, the free trade agreement that China and the Persian Gulf states are pursuing will likely be signed this year, increasing their economic interdependence.

Within this context, China also faces competitors such as Japan and South Korea in the region. For example, the defense system that South Korea provided to the UAE reportedly performed relatively successfully in intercepting exported Iranian missiles and drones. Additionally, despite legal constraints, Japan is increasing technical cooperation in the military domain—a development that has facilitated the presence of other actors in the security sphere with Arab countries. China’s role in economic matters will also become more prominent, while America’s security role will gradually diminish. If current Arab perceptions persist, the United States will remain the primary security actor, but economic competition will constitute the core dynamic. In the technology sector as well, should data centers in Arab countries come under attack during a conflict—transforming this into a security issue—there is a possibility that these countries’ relations could shift toward China. In the military domain as well, it appears that alongside China, other actors such as South Korea and Japan will claim a larger share of Arab countries’ arms portfolios, although this process will proceed at a gradual pace.