Amirhossein Moghimi – Researcher of French Legal Affairs

Although cases such as the murder of “Lihana,” due to their social sensitivity and extensive media coverage, have played an accelerating role in revealing this gap, existing trends indicate that the issue is linked to a structural crisis in the public perception of the effectiveness of criminal justice institutions and, more broadly, to the erosion of the state’s institutional capital in France. This development, in fact, reflects a gradual shift from “institutional trust” to “institutional doubt” in one of the most important countries of Western Europe.

Official data and independent surveys in recent years indicate that the decline in trust in the judiciary in France has been a gradual and cumulative phenomenon whose roots must be sought in a set of structural factors. On the one hand, public perceptions regarding the lengthy nature of judicial processes, the complexity of legal procedures, and the gap between societal expectations of justice and the actual output of the judicial system have led to the emergence of a kind of expectation gap.

On the other hand, the increasing sense of insecurity in certain urban areas, the growth of sporadic violence, and the media representation of these incidents have strengthened the perception that the criminal justice system faces serious limitations in preventing and managing crime. Under such circumstances, every high-profile criminal case is perceived not as an isolated event but as a symbol of structural inefficiency, thereby reproducing the cycle of distrust.

At a deeper level, what is occurring can be regarded as part of a broader crisis of trust in public institutions in France and several other European countries. The simultaneous decline in trust in the police, the judiciary, and even political institutions demonstrates that the issue is not merely judicial in nature; rather, it involves a form of erosion of social capital and a weakening of the state–nation relationship at the perceptual level.

In the governance literature, this trend is evaluated as a decline in the state’s capacity to generate sustainable consent and soft legitimacy—a capacity which, in liberal democratic systems, is based more than anything else on institutional effectiveness and public trust.

In this context, the role of France’s domestic political and social developments in intensifying this trend should not be overlooked. The polarization of the political environment, the increasing weight of extremist currents in public discourse, and the transformation of judicial and security issues into subjects of political contention have caused the judiciary to become more exposed to external pressures and political interpretations. This situation has gradually weakened the perceived independence of the judiciary in the minds of public opinion and transformed it from a purely legal institution into part of broader political and social conflicts. The result of such a process is a decline in the symbolic capital of justice and the weakening of its soft authority within society.

From a geopolitical perspective, these developments cannot be confined solely to France’s domestic context. Rather, they should be analyzed within the broader transformations of Europe’s political order and its gradual transition from a “liberal-normative” model toward more “security-oriented” models. Declining trust in judicial and law-enforcement institutions, particularly in countries such as France that play a central role in the legal architecture of the European Union, gradually creates the conditions for strengthening more hardline political discourses, increasing the influence of right-wing movements, and redefining public policy priorities from the sphere of rights and freedoms toward the sphere of security and control.

In the medium term, this discursive shift may affect immigration, social policies, and even Europe’s foreign policy approaches.

From the perspective of foreign policy and international relations, declining institutional trust within European countries carries consequences beyond national borders. One of the principal components of Europe’s soft power in the international system is its claim to institutional and normative superiority in areas such as human rights, justice, and the rule of law.

The weakening of domestic trust in judicial institutions indirectly challenges this normative narrative and may reduce Europe’s persuasive power in the international arena. Under such conditions, Europe’s capacity for legal and political consensus-building in international cases may also face greater limitations, and its foreign policy may increasingly shift toward pragmatism and security and economic considerations.

These developments can be understood within the framework of gradual changes in Europe’s policy behavior. Although such trends do not imply a fundamental transformation in Europe’s overall approaches toward other regions, including West Asia, they may, in the medium term, lead to the moderation of certain normative and legal approaches and an increase in the weight of pragmatic considerations.

At a time when European governments are facing domestic challenges related to public trust and social cohesion, their foreign policy priorities naturally tend toward managing domestic crises, controlling migration, and maintaining economic stability. This may create a diplomatic environment that is complex yet, at the same time, more flexible in certain areas.

Given current trends, at least three general scenarios can be envisioned regarding the future of trust in judicial institutions and its consequences in France and, consequently, in Europe. In the first scenario, through institutional reforms, greater transparency, and improved efficiency of judicial processes, it may be possible to achieve relative stabilization and halt the downward trend of trust, although a return to the high levels of trust of the past appears unlikely.

In the second scenario, the intensification of the security-oriented environment and the strengthening of hardline political currents may lead to greater social control while simultaneously deepening the gap between society and judicial institutions.

In the third scenario, which is conceivable if current trends continue, a chronic state of institutional distrust may emerge, resulting in the gradual erosion of social capital and increased periodic political instability.

Overall, what is currently being observed in France in the form of declining trust in the judiciary is not merely a statistical indicator; rather, it is a sign of deeper transformations in the relationship between the state and society and a reflection of the structural challenges of governance in advanced European societies. If not managed effectively, this trend may have consequences extending beyond the judicial sphere and affect political stability, social cohesion, and the international role of France and Europe as a whole.

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