Sina Raimand – International affairs expert

The Shift in the Balance of Connectivity

The security developments between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, along with the relative decline of Russia’s role following the Ukraine war, have altered the geopolitical environment surrounding Iran. In its 2026-2031 five-year plan, Armenia no longer describes relations with Russia as a “strategic alliance,” and Russia has been placed after the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, Georgia, the European Union, the United States, and France in the order of this country’s foreign policy priorities. Simultaneously, the future of Russia’s military base in Gyumri has faced uncertainties. These developments do not mean Russia’s immediate exit from the Caucasus, but they indicate a decline in Moscow’s traditional monopoly over the region’s security environment.

For Iran, any change in the Caucasus security balance is directly linked to the country’s connectivity geography. The weakening of Russia’s monopoly, on one hand, can create more space for Tehran, but on the other hand, the increased role of Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan in transit networks can strengthen routes that may not necessarily align with Iran’s interests.

The So-called Zangezur Corridor and the Middle Corridor; Competition over “Connectability”

The competition between Iran’s North-South Corridor and the Middle Corridor is not merely a competition between two railway lines. The Middle Corridor, passing through China and Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, is transforming into a multi-layered network of transportation, energy, digital communications, and investment. In 2025, the Republic of Azerbaijan gained full participation in the consultative meetings of Central Asian heads of state, and in the summer of 2026, it expanded its relations with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and other Central Asian countries. This trend indicates that Baku is seeking to transform from a transit country in the Caucasus into a connecting link between the Caucasus, the Caspian, and Central Asia.

In this framework, projects related to the so-called Zangezur corridor should be seen as part of a broader architecture of regional connectivity. The connection of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s mainland to Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, if implemented, could create a more direct link between the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the Middle Corridor network; therefore, the issue is not merely the passage of a railway line, but the possibility of forming a network that reduces Iran’s share in connecting the Caucasus to Central Asia and Europe.

In contrast, Iran, to prevent such a situation, has pursued a strategy of “route diversification.” The Russian International Affairs Council’s analysis of Iran’s transit policy considers the routes passing through the Republic of Azerbaijan as well as the Iran-Armenia-Georgia route as complementary to each other and emphasizes the importance of developing the Rasht-Astara railway and linking the northern corridors with Iran’s southern ports and networks.

Turkey; Developing Geopolitical Capacity Beyond Balancing

The increase in Turkey’s role cannot be explained merely by the concept of “balancing between East and West.” A recent study by the German SWP Institute emphasizes that the more important issue is Ankara’s ability to practically utilize its diverse relations; that is, how Turkey uses various capacities to increase its role in the surrounding environment.

This issue becomes more important in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey’s cultural and linguistic ties with the group known as the Turkic-speaking republics, alongside investment, defense cooperation, energy, and transportation, enable Ankara to strengthen its influence through a network of connections. From the perspective of critics of Turkey’s policy, this trend can also be linked to pan-Turkist readings; however, analytically, it is better to consider it a set of geopolitical, economic, and identity instruments.

At the same time, Turkey’s internal changes and the new process related to the disarmament of the PKK can also increase Ankara’s regional room for maneuver. The Russian International Affairs Council considers this process to have implications for Iraq, Syria, and Iran’s surrounding environment.

China; Capital, Network, and Reproduction of Dependency

In this competition, China plays a role more by linking existing networks to its economy than by creating a single corridor. A clear example is the activation of the China-Central Asia-Iran railway route; the first train, comprising 55 wagons from Xinjiang, entered Kazakhstan and is scheduled to reach Iran via Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The continuation of this process can increase Iran’s connectivity capacity to China’s overland network and turn Central Asia into an important link in Iran-China trade.

On the other hand, Kazakhstan is consolidating its position as a “middle power” and a connector of China, Russia, Europe, Turkey, and other centers of power. The Trans-Caspian route for Astana is not merely a transportation route and is linked with logistics, customs digitalization, and peripheral industries. This situation indicates that China and Central Asian actors are not necessarily seeking to choose between rival corridors and are trying to use the overlap of routes to increase their bargaining power.

Sanctions; A Determining Factor in Transit Competition

One of the most important limitations of these routes is US extraterritorial sanctions. Recent reports on Central Asia warn that secondary sanctions can complicate even exchanges that are not legally prohibited; because banks, insurance, and transportation companies may excessively avoid cooperation with routes related to Iran to reduce risk. In such circumstances, building a railway or port alone is not sufficient for the success of a transit route, and the necessary financial and insurance system for its use must also exist.

This issue also extends to China’s relations with Iran. Using Central Asia to transfer goods to Iran can reduce the vulnerability of some exchanges, but at the same time, it exposes intermediary countries to more sanctions pressures. As a result, the success of Iran’s corridors depends as much on infrastructure as on the ability of Tehran and its partners to manage sanctions risk.

The Desirable Strategy

In such circumstances, Iran’s realistic strategy should be to prevent itself from becoming the “eliminated link” in the new architecture of Eurasian connectivity. The realization of this goal requires measures such as accelerating the Rasht-Astara project, developing railway and road connections to Central Asia, strengthening southern ports and linking them to the north, activating the Iran-Armenia-Georgia route, and creating financial and insurance arrangements to reduce the impact of sanctions.

At the diplomatic level as well, Tehran can simultaneously engage with Baku, Yerevan, Astana, Ankara, Moscow, and Beijing and arrange the scene in such a way that competition does not turn into a “zero-sum game.” Cooperation with the Republic of Azerbaijan on complementary routes and dialogue with Armenia on transportation arrangements can also help preserve Iran’s options.

Ultimately, the transit competition in the Caucasus and Central Asia is more about controlling the “connectivity network” than about seizing a single corridor. If Iran can simultaneously activate several complementary routes and maintain its position in the network of China, Central Asia, Russia, and the Caucasus, regional developments will not necessarily lead to a reduction in its geopolitical depth. Otherwise, the combination of Turkey’s increasing influence, the cross-border connectivity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Central Asia, and China’s capital and network can shift part of Iran’s geographical advantage in favor of rivals.