Sina Raimand – International relations expert

Hormuz; from energy chokepoint to the arena of international order rearrangement

The Strait of Hormuz crisis cannot be regarded merely as a military extension of the US war against Iran or a temporary disruption in global trade. This crisis is, in fact, the confluence of several structural trends in the international system that have gradually taken shape over recent decades and have now manifested. What transpired in Hormuz is less a battle over control of a waterway than a test of the credibility of the order that had been established after the Cold War on the basis of US maritime supremacy, freedom of navigation, and the globalization of energy trade.

For the first time since the consolidation of the maritime order after World War II, the world’s most important oil transit route was removed from the normal cycle of trade for a relatively extended period, and this event demonstrated that even the world’s largest maritime power can no longer unilaterally guarantee the security of strategic energy routes. This very issue caused the concept of “freedom of navigation,” long considered one of the pillars of the liberal order, to face fundamental questions regarding its effectiveness and sustainability. Many analysts have assessed this development as a severe blow to the existing maritime order and have considered it the beginning of a new phase of competition over the governance of the seas.

In such circumstances, Hormuz has transformed from an international waterway into a point where energy, security, economy, and geopolitics have become intertwined in an unprecedented manner. For this reason, the significance of the recent crisis should be analyzed not merely within the framework of a regional military confrontation, but within the context of a shift in the global balance of power.

The end of exclusive US guarantee of maritime security

One of the most important consequences of the recent crisis has been the exposure of the limitations of the traditional US strategy for ensuring maritime security. Since the 1980s, the extensive US naval presence in the Persian Gulf has been based on the assumption that Washington, relying on its military superiority, could guarantee the flow of energy according to Washington’s preferred rules. However, the recent war demonstrated that even the large-scale deployment of naval forces does not necessarily translate into the ability to prevent disruptions to shipping traffic.

This reality exposed a clear contradiction in the “energy dominance” doctrine of the Donald Trump administration. This doctrine was based on increasing US energy production, reducing dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and maintaining Washington’s geopolitical superiority, but the Strait of Hormuz crisis showed that the US strategy does not immunize the global economy from the vulnerability arising from disruption in this waterway. The global oil market remains an integrated market, and any disruption in supply leaves its mark on prices, supply chains, and economic growth worldwide. Therefore, even if the United States has less direct dependence on the region’s oil, it still has to bear the geopolitical costs of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand, the experience of the recent crisis showed that sole reliance on hard power is no longer sufficient to maintain maritime security. The security of Hormuz has become more dependent than ever on confidence-building mechanisms and regional cooperation. This development is a sign of the gradual transition from a hegemonic model to a participatory model in maritime governance.

If the Hormuz crisis marks the beginning of the end of the US monopoly on guaranteeing maritime security, the fundamental question is which actors will be able, through cooperation with Iran, to fill the void resulting from this transformation?

The most important strategic development of the recent crisis is that energy interdependence is no longer merely a factor in economic convergence, but has become an instrument for exerting geopolitical pressure. In the past, interdependence was viewed as a deterrent factor against conflicts, but the Hormuz experience showed that this same interdependence can become an effective weapon in great power competition.

In such circumstances, the concept of energy security has also undergone transformation, and the future energy order will be shaped less by the supremacy of a single power and more by a set of joint cooperations among various actors. For this reason, the Hormuz crisis should be seen not as the end of a conflict, but as the beginning of a new era in maritime governance. The future of this waterway will no longer be determined by the deployment of naval fleets, but will be shaped at negotiating tables, through collective security arrangements, and through interaction among influential powers.

Ultimately, the Hormuz crisis demonstrated that this strategic waterway has changed its nature from a “free waterway” to a “geopolitical pressure point.” The hypothesis of unchallenged US dominance over energy security is incompatible with new field realities, and the “energy dominance” doctrine also faces serious limitations in the face of the consequences of the closure of Hormuz. If this trend continues, the Hormuz crisis will be recorded in historical memory not as a naval war, but as the starting point of a multipolar energy order and the end of the US monopoly on guaranteeing maritime security.