While in previous military conflicts usually not much lands were handed over, in the current war the Republic of Azerbaijan, with the support of mainly Turkey, has made major advancements. These advances have been made in the five regions of Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Khojavend, Zangilan and Ghobadli. Given that continuation of the conflict in Karabakh and the specific dimensions of this conflict are of great importance to Iran’s national security, the need for Tehran to play a role in this crisis is felt more than ever. Especially since the presence of terrorist groups near the northern borders of Iran, as well as the special policies of major players, has further complicated the crisis.

Presence of Terrorists, a Threat to Regional Security

Simultaneously with the outbreak of war in the Karabakh region, the role played by foreign forces has been more noticed than ever. If in the past government players were considered as the influential forces in this conflict, now, once again, the matter of presence of the terrorist groups has been raised in a way that one of the most important aspects of the recent conflict in the Karabakh region is transfer of terrorist groups from the Middle East and North Africa to the Caucasus. Prior to the recent clashes, at least in two other instances reference had been made to the presence of terrorist groups in the Karabakh conflict. The first time was in the 1990s conflicts and the second time in the April 2016 four-day war, when reports on the presence of the terrorist groups in the Caucasus were released. In the 1990s, most of the terrorists were the Arab-Afghan militants who departed for Chechnya after the end of the war in Karabakh to fight against the Russian central government and try to establish their own Islamic Caliphate. In 2016 too, terrorist groups with the centric role of Saudi Arabia, emerged in Karabakh but the rapid end of the war did not give them much opportunity to flaunt.

At present, different reports indicate that at least some members of the Hamza Division, Sultan Murad Division, Jaish al-Sharqiya, Al-Nokhba Army, Jabhat al-Sham, al-Mu’tasim Brigade, al-Furqan Brigade, and the Islamic Movement of the East (Uighurs) are present in the Karabakh war which have been deployed in the interest of Turkey, the Republic of Azerbaijan and Israel.

Although the withdrawal of a significant number of elements of the terrorist groups from Syria is a good opportunity to launch operations and purge the occupied territories in the northwest of the country, it should be noted that presence of hundreds of terrorists close to Iran’s northwest borders with the widespread Turkish support under the pretext of recapturing Karabakh region could lead to the repetition of Syrian scenario near Iran, which is intolerable and a serious threat to the national security of Iran.

Special Interests of the Big Powers

In addition to the presence of terrorist groups along Iran’s borders, the special interests of major players can also complicate and prolong the Caucasus crisis. Among foreign players, the role of Russia and the US has been significant over the past years. The Americans, who do not have much power to play a role in the current Karabakh war due to their involvement in the presidential elections, have tried to maintain their influence by launching a peace plan for trans-regional forces. However, other players, including Russia, are unlikely to agree with such a plan, as the Russians have long opposed such a move and called for the deployment of their troops on the Azerbaijan-Armenia contact lines. No doubt, the Russians are well aware of the risks presence of the US troops or those of the US allies would pose to the security of the Caucasus as well as Russia under the guise of trans-regional peacekeeping forces.

On the other hand, despite the fact that the Minsk Group has largely been unsuccessful in recent years and has not been able to find a comprehensive solution to the Karabakh conflict, Russia still continues to support the group for several reasons:

First, existence of the Minsk Group is more about keeping the Karabakh conflict frozen rather than for resolving it. Certainly, such a mechanism would be desirable for Russia as it would benefit from the existence of such a conflict rather than its solution.

Second, given Russia’s heavier weight than that of France and the US in the Minsk Group, Moscow’s influence over the Karabakh conflict is far greater than that of Paris and Washington. Therefore, changing a mechanism that has both international legitimacy and been recognized by the UN Security Council, and Russia has a dominant position in it, is not in Moscow’s best interest.

Third, the Russians are well aware that Turkey’s ultimate goal in participating in the Karabakh war is not merely to help the Republic of Azerbaijan win the battle, rather Ankara pursues its long-term geopolitical goals in the Caucasus region. For this reason, Moscow will not accept any change in the negotiating framework that would give more weight to Turkey or increase Ankara’s ability to play in the Caucasus region.

Iran’s Position for Playing a Role

While the Karabakh crisis is becoming more complicated due to the presence of the terrorists and the policies of the big powers, for several reasons Iran has a prominent role to play in the developments of the Caucasus region, especially the Karabakh crisis and these factors highlight the need for Tehran to play a more active role:

First, the Caucasus region and the disputed areas have all historically been parts of the Iranian territories, so Iran has a civilizational, historical and cultural influence in the Caucasus region.

Second, Iran is the only country that has joint land border with Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. In fact, geographical proximity requires that Iran should be highly sensitive to the developments along its borders.

Third, continuation of any war and conflict can have destructive and detrimental impacts on Iran’s national security. In addition to the mortars and missiles of the two sides that hit the Iranian soil, presence of trans-regional players and their military, intelligence and security infiltration near the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran is undesirable and intolerable.

Fourth, unlike the countries that have tried to enter the Karabakh conflict unilaterally over the past years to incite sedition, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards this conflict has always been a fair and conciliatory policy and Tehran has tried to follow the policy of balancing and the policy of resolving disputes of neighboring countries. In fact, Iran has always stressed that neither of the two sides should resort to coercive methods and military measures. Because, a merely peaceful solution to the Karabakh conflict is necessary based on the respect for territorial integrity, and there is no prerequisite for resolving it other than the negotiation process.

Fifth, unlike most of the players involved in the Karabakh conflict who seek one-dimensional and utilitarian solutions, in view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the solution of this conflict is possible only within the framework of regional cooperation and trans-regional forces have not yet taken a positive and effective measure in this regard or are not capable of doing so. An example of this situation is the Minsk Group’s effort over the past years to resolve the Karabakh conflict, which has so far yielded no practical results and has only included negotiations for negotiations.

With regard to the above cases, it is necessary for Iran to enter into diplomatic activities more seriously and continue its regional consultations to put an end to the current war and find a suitable solution mutually agreed upon.