Hamid Khoshayand – an expert on regional issues

The impact of the Gaza war on the result of the recent US presidential election and Trump’s re into the White House can be analyzed from two perspectives:

First, under the grand strategies of the foreign policies of the United States regarding the Zionist regime and its conflict with the Palestinian Islamic Resistance about which, there is no ambiguity. The comprehensive support of the US for the Zionist regime is one of the “sustainable strategies” of the foreign policy of the United States of America, and no president of any type and character can act against it.

Second relates to analyzing the behavior, methods and “tactics” of Trump’s foreign policy. Here again, there are two general views:

According to the first view, which is “pessimistic,” when Trump enters the White House, efforts to establish a ceasefire in Gaza will stop. On the contrary, the war in Gaza and Lebanon will intensify because Trump has close relations with Netanyahu and strongly supports his warmongering policies.

On September 19, during his speech at the “Israeli-American Council” in Washington, Trump said that with the vote of American Jews, he would become their “defender,” “protector,” and “the best friend that American Jews have ever had in the White House.” It is noteworthy that in that speech, he considered the recent American elections, which ended with his victory, “the most important elections in the history of Israel”!

Unlike the Democrats, who were more focused on the “ceasefire” agreement and the release of prisoners, Trump is mainly focused on ending the war in Gaza by guaranteeing the “victory” of the Zionist regime without giving concessions to Hamas and Hezbollah.

According to the second view, which is largely “optimistic,” a set of factors including Trump’s high influence on Netanyahu, his increased level of political maturity compared to the previous period, showing a pacifist face, recalculating the cost and benefit of continuing the war for the United States, preventing the waste of American economic, financial, and military resources in the Gaza war, etc., will make Trump immediately put the end of the war in Gaza on his agenda.

As said, the issue is evident in macro and strategic dimensions. But considering the various statements that even Trump himself has made, it is not possible to give an accurate estimate of his foreign policy tactics regarding the Gaza war and what will happen to Gaza when he enters the White House.

With all these interpretations, three important and key points should be noted:

One: Trump entering the White House will not make a big difference. He will do what Biden is doing now. Despite Trump’s business-oriented view of politics and the fact that he does not have a clear theory or a fixed view on how to govern the world, in the field of foreign and domestic politics, he cannot act unconventionally and outside of “partisan outlooks and decision-making bases and macro policies.”

Of course, to resume the “normalization process” and show a positive face at the beginning, Trump may ask Netanyahu to stop the war in Gaza in exchange for some concessions.

Two: The experience of more than 70 years of struggle has shown that the Islamic resistance in occupied Palestine follows a clearly defined policy and is not affected by political changes in America or the Zionist regime and hostile countries. As in recent weeks, Hamas Hezbollah and various resistance groups in the region have announced that the resistance of Palestine and Lebanon will rely on the battlefield, not political changes and the transfer of power of presidents in America.

As long as belligerence and occupation continue, the process of resistance, struggle, and anti-Zionist actions will continue with greater depth, scope, and newer dimensions. There are only two ways to end the Gaza war:

1. An “agreement” that includes the conditions of Palestinian and Lebanese resistance in a real and objective manner.
2. The fate of the war will be determined on the “battlefield.” The Resistance will continue to implement the war program and remain on the path of war within conventional political approaches.

Three; despite the maximum support of the United States for the Zionist regime, so that in the past one year it has filled the weapons warehouses of the Zionist regime more than 95 times, the Tel Aviv regime has “failed grossly” in realizing the declared and practical goals of the war. The few successes it has had so far have been tactical and temporary. Netanyahu removed his Defense Minister Gallant because he presented an unconcealed reality to Netanyahu; that Hezbollah and Hamas cannot be defeated.

In the current situation, Netanyahu’s war cabinet’s insistence on continuing the war will ultimately get nowhere. Because both Biden and Netanyahu have made decisions and are acting based on “wrong calculations” in this war, the result is clear.

Trump has no choice but to learn from the mistakes of the Biden administration and act based on “correct calculations.” Continuing to support the Zionist regime in a war they have no chance of victory will end up to the detriment of the Trump administration and will increase his “foreign and domestic policy costs”. Therefore, Trump’s focus on ending the war in Gaza and Lebanon to get rid of the heavy costs that this war has imposed on the United States and focus on his other priorities seems to be a very possible option.