Mohammad Bayat – Researcher of Middle East Affairs

With the seizure of Hadramawt and Al-Mahrah by Yemeni separatists, the UAE not only gains control over oil resources but also strengthens its military bases to monitor the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which poses a threat to maritime supply lines in the region. At the same time, the intensification of competition among forces affiliated with Riyadh–Abu Dhabi strengthens Ansarullah’s position as a balancing force. By reducing pressure on the southern front, Ansarullah can focus on consolidating control in the north and intensifying its asymmetric attacks against hostile targets, thereby reinforcing its confrontation strategy against the Western-Arab coalition.

Ansarullah’s position in these equations has been indirectly strengthened. With southern separatists focusing on the east, military pressure on the north has decreased, allowing the Resistance to consolidate its governing institutions in Sana’a and Hajjah. The movements of the “Southern Transitional Council,” which Ansarullah describes as the “deliberate fragmentation of the south,” have enabled the Resistance to intensify missile attacks on the ports of Aden and Ma’rib while simultaneously delaying ceasefire negotiations with the United Nations. This situation has placed Ansarullah in a superior position, as divisions in the south have weakened the “anti-Sana’a” coalition’s coordination and diverted the Presidential Leadership Council’s resources toward internal conflicts. By leveraging tribal networks in Al-Bayda, Ansarullah has expanded its influence eastward and has threatened retaliatory attacks against Emirati forces.

The interests of domestic and foreign actors in these movements reveal complex layers of regional rivalries. Hadrami tribes led by Sheikh Abdullah bin Omar bin Issa, who are aligned with the Presidential Leadership Council, have resisted southern separatists and called for local autonomy. At the same time, forces loyal to Tariq Saleh, known as the “National Resistance Forces,” in Shabwa have announced conditional support for the “Southern Transitional Council” to counter Ansarullah’s influence. This development highlights economic interests. By controlling Hadramawt’s oil fields, the Southern Transitional Council seeks to monopolize gas and oil revenues, which account for more than 70 percent of Yemen’s exports. At the external level, the Emiratis use southern Yemeni separatists as a tool to contain the Axis of Resistance and to establish maritime bases in Al-Mahrah. Saudi Arabia views these actions as a threat to Yemen’s unity and its own border security and has increased efforts to contain the Southern Transitional Council by exerting diplomatic pressure on the Presidential Leadership Council. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), focusing on maritime security, also provides indirect support to the Southern Transitional Council as an anti-Resistance ally. Still, this support has disrupted the fragile balance of the Saudi–Emirati coalition.

In early December, the Southern Transitional Council intensified its field activities in eastern Yemen by launching large-scale military operations in the provinces of Hadramawt and Al-Mahrah. These operations, which began on December 2, aimed at seizing key oil centers and strategic ports such as Seiyun and Nasib, and quickly resulted in control over large parts of these areas. Forces affiliated with southern separatists, including the Security Belt and Hadrami Elite Forces, with direct logistical support from Abu Dhabi, crushed the resistance of local forces allied with the Presidential Leadership Council. Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the leader of southern separatists, justified these actions as “liberation from terrorist elements.” Still, analyses indicate that these movements are part of a separatist strategy to consolidate control over the former south of Yemen. In the political arena, the STC, by forming temporary administrative committees in Al-Mahrah, has attempted to establish parallel institutions to the central government, thereby escalating tensions with Rashad Mohammed al-Alimi, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council. These developments, occurring while the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia temporarily closed its borders, indicate a deep rift within the anti-Sana’a coalition and have increased the risk of escalating internal conflicts.

Abu Dhabi believes that the inefficiency of the Presidential Council in improving conditions in the south and implementing political-economic reforms, the persistent disagreements among the eight members of the Presidential Council, shifts in field power, and recent events in eastern Yemen have once again highlighted the necessity of reshuffling the apex of power in the Aden government. Some media figures close to the Saudi royal court have stated that Riyadh intends to reshuffle the Presidential Council and reduce its number by summoning anti-Ansarullah political figures to Riyadh in the coming days, to enable the Aden government to build up operational capacity more quickly. If we assume that Riyadh will undertake such a move, that Riyadh will continue to insist on coordination with Abu Dhabi, and that selected forces must possess field capacity, it appears that the new council may include figures such as: Aidarous al-Zubaidi, who holds field power in southern Yemen (supported by the UAE and southern forces); Tariq Saleh, who controls the power of the western coast forces (supported by the UAE and General People’s Congress affiliates); Bashir al-Madrabi, who commands the Al-Dar’ al-Watan forces (supported by Saudi Arabia and Salafi currents); and Sultan al-Aradah, a tribal figure from Marib who commands the forces of that province (supported by Saudi Arabia and the Islah party).