Hamed Vafaei – Professor of China Studies, University of Tehran
This proposal, which has been presented simultaneously with the recent aggression by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran and the recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, should be described as Beijing’s latest declared framework for playing a role in this sensitive, fragile, and complex environment.
According to the recent positions of the President of China, the four main pillars of this proposal are as follows:
- Adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence and the necessity of building a “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security architecture” for West Asia and the Persian Gulf.
- Adherence to the principle of national sovereignty with full respect for the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the countries of the region, and the protection of the safety of personnel, facilities, and civilian institutions of all countries.
- Adherence to the principle of the rule of international law with the aim of preserving the authority of international law in order to prevent the world’s return to the “law of the jungle”; and
- The coordination of the two matters of “development and security” with the aim of creating a favorable environment for the development of the countries of the region and linking the two categories of security and development.
This proposal can be described as an important part of China’s “diplomacy and Global Security Initiative” strategy in the era of the multipolarization of the international system, the key dimensions of which include opposition to domination and unilateralism; a matter that, in the third clause, with an explicit reference to the phrase “law of the jungle,” directly refers to the current policies of the United States, including the naval blockade of Iran’s ports, joint attacks with the Israeli regime, and repeated violations of ceasefires by Washington and Tel Aviv.
Beijing believes that the West, especially the United States, through force and sanctions, has returned the world to the era of the “jungle”; while China proposes the “peaceful path of development” to the world. These concepts are among the key terms known as “Chinese characteristics” in Xi’s diplomacy, or “Xiplomacy,” which gain meaning alongside principles such as non-interference, development orientation, and opposition to unilateralism.
Xi, in fact, through this language, introduces his country as a “responsible major power” and a defender of “multilateralism” in the turbulent international system, and implicitly declares that the Western liberal order centered on the United States has failed. It is also necessary to recall that this is precisely the same language that Beijing used during the Ukraine war and the Gaza crisis.
Another dimension of this proposal is its security dimension and the proposal of a new architecture in this field, which is articulated in the first clause by presenting principles that can be described as a reiteration of parts of Xi Jinping’s “Global Security Initiative.” In this regard, instead of military alliances and frameworks such as NATO or the “United States–Israel–Arabs” axis, China focuses on a “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable” architecture in the region. The important point is that this architecture is “non-American.” This framework is the same concept that China demonstrated in 2023 through its mediation between Tehran and Riyadh.
Another dimension of this proposal is its sovereignty dimension and the principle of non-interference, which, in the second clause, addresses the rearticulation of China’s classical position in confronting the approach of Trump’s America in cases such as “regime change” or “blockade.” This clause of Xi’s proposal directly defends Iran’s right to defend its territorial integrity and its waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz, and portrays the United States’ blockade as an illegal action. It should, however, be noted that China’s emphasis on territorial integrity and national sovereignty also takes into account its reservations regarding potential actions by Tehran in response to enemy aggressions from the territory of these countries.
Another dimension of this proposal is its economic-developmental dimension, which can be interpreted as one of the fundamental principles of China’s foreign policy and as the beating heart of Chinese diplomacy (Xiplomacy). The concepts intended by Xi Jinping in this clause should be sought within the content of his “Global Development Initiative.” An initiative that, by emphasizing “socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era,” underscores that China is no longer an “emerging power,” but rather, as a “responsible major power,” seeks to create stability through economy and diplomacy without deploying troops or sending weapons.
Overall, this proposal can be described not as a temporary tactical proposal, but as a long-term strategic framework for a “post-American West Asia.” It can be said that Xi Jinping, through this initiative, seeks to present China as a “neutral extra-regional major power,” or in other words, a “balancing weight” that maintains a strategic relationship with Iran, a comprehensive partnership with the Gulf Arabs, and economic relations with the Israeli regime.
In this context, the Strait of Hormuz card has created this golden opportunity for Tehran to elevate the level of its relations with China as a global power, from the usual and traditional framework of the past decade to the level of a “balancing weight,” while adhering to national interests and the three principles of dignity, wisdom, and expediency.
In light of Xi Jinping’s four-point proposal, China’s capacity to play a role in this crisis can be increased, but in the medium term it should be assessed as limited to soft and economic instruments. At the same time, considering the realities of policymaking in China under Xi Jinping’s leadership, it is necessary to understand that, in view of the objectives and frameworks of the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing’s potential mediation in this crisis will primarily be “facilitative” rather than “guarantor” in nature; this clearly has its roots in “Chinese realism” and the principle of “friendship without alliance.”
Ultimately, this proposal can be described as an indication of a new level of effort by an emerging major pole in the international system to utilize the existing environment for the definitive transition of West Asia from an “American order” to a “multipolar order,” in which China can have an unprecedented centrality.
The realization of this new order is, in the first instance, contingent upon the acceptance of regional actors, and in the subsequent stage requires Beijing’s movement from the phase of caution to new domains. The intelligent acceptance of this environment for Iran, in addition to elevating the level of Tehran–Beijing interactions, can lead to the facilitation of the country’s economic reconstruction after the war and a relative reduction of ongoing existential threats; however, the ultimate success of such an order naturally depends on whether Tehran and Beijing can transform this framework into a “grand bargain” or not.
Therefore, Xi’s proposal can be regarded as a manifestation of “Chinese patience diplomacy” in the Hormuz crisis, with entirely Chinese roots, including non-military, non-interventionist, and development-oriented engagement, and the calibration of a balanced movement (from a Chinese perspective) between Iran as an anti-American partner and the Arabs as economic partners, aimed at weakening American hegemony without direct confrontation.
In such an environment, the Islamic Republic of Iran must pay attention to several fundamental principles: first, that Beijing is a “friend,” but it views the world through a “Chinese” lens and thinks from the perspective of China’s interests; this means economy first, then security, and ultimately strategic patience.
Tehran must take into account that Xi’s proposal is a window of opportunity, not a guarantee, and if Tehran examines and analyzes it with a realistic perspective and an understanding of the Chinese viewpoint on today’s and tomorrow’s global developments, it can use the Chinese economic lever to reduce pressures and balance the current complex conditions.
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