Abed Akbari – International Affairs Expert

Over past decades, the United States has consistently justified its role in the Persian Gulf with concepts such as guaranteeing energy security and protecting freedom of navigation. In practice, however, U.S. policies in the region have often been accompanied by a set of political tensions, security rivalries, and periodic crises. This situation, particularly from the perspective of actors such as China, which depend on the stable flow of energy from the Persian Gulf, has created a form of structural instability in the management of one of the most important arteries of the global economy.

From the viewpoint of many Chinese analysts, one of the fundamental challenges of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is the inability to establish a sustainable and inclusive security framework for the region. Washington’s presence and policies in the region have often been defined within the framework of limited alliances and geopolitical rivalries, rather than in the form of arrangements that could integrate the diverse interests of regional actors into a collective mechanism. The result of such an approach is the persistence of a level of mistrust and competition that itself has become a source of uncertainty for the security of chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

Another challenge is the linkage of energy policy and maritime security with broader geopolitical rivalries. In recent years, with the intensification of competition between Washington and Beijing, some discussions in U.S. strategic circles have referred to the possibility of employing economic and maritime pressures against China. Even if these views have not necessarily been transformed into official policy, the mere articulation of such ideas is, for a country like China that is highly dependent on energy imports, an indication of the fragility of the existing order in vital energy routes.

From this perspective, the issue for Beijing is not merely the security of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, a more fundamental question is raised regarding the nature of the global maritime order. If the security of vital chokepoints of global trade is, in practice, affected by geopolitical rivalries, then countries whose economies depend on the free flow of energy will inevitably seek alternative strategies to reduce their vulnerability.

China’s response to this situation has largely taken the form of a multidimensional strategy. First, Beijing has sought to create a network of mutual economic dependencies through expanding economic and energy relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf, which itself becomes a factor for stability. Today, China is one of the most important trading partners of many countries in the region, and this economic linkage creates a shared incentive for maintaining the stability of energy routes.

Second, China is interested, as much as possible, in contributing to the reduction of geopolitical tensions in the region through active diplomacy. Beijing’s mediation in the process of normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in recent years has, from the perspective of many observers, been an indication of China’s effort to play a different role in managing regional tensions. For a country that secures a significant part of its energy security from the Persian Gulf, the reduction of tensions among key regional actors is directly linked to its strategic interests.

Third, at a broader level, China has sought to create more diverse routes for trade and energy through infrastructure projects and economic corridors. The Belt and Road Initiative can be regarded as part of this broader effort to reduce absolute dependence on specific maritime routes. Although the Strait of Hormuz will remain one of the vital routes for China’s economy, diversification of transit options can to some extent reduce strategic vulnerabilities, and these developments reflect the familiar logic of Chinese realism in the international system. Major powers always seek to reduce their structural vulnerabilities and to provide more options for securing their vital interests in the face of environmental uncertainties. Within such a framework, China’s response to existing uncertainties in the security of energy chokepoints can be regarded as an effort to manage these very vulnerabilities.

Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz today is not merely an energy passage, but a mirror in which the challenges of the global order are also reflected. From China’s perspective, the most important issue is not competition over control of this chokepoint, but the creation of arrangements that can shield its stability from the fluctuations of geopolitical rivalries. If the security of such routes becomes excessively entangled in great power competition, the cost will ultimately be borne by the global economy. For this reason, for many energy-dependent actors, particularly in Asia, an approach that emphasizes cooperation with Iran for the reduction of tensions, economic cooperation, and comprehensive management of regional security appears to be a more realistic option for maintaining stability in one of the most vital arteries of the global economy.

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