Mansour Barati – Expert on Israeli Affairs

With the commencement of the 40-day war in late February, although Netanyahu’s popularity increased to some extent—with Likud Party seats rising from 25 to 28 in credible polls—this increase in Likud seats did not come from Likud’s rivals; rather, these seats shifted from Likud’s coalition partners toward Likud itself, particularly from the “Jewish Power” party led by Ben-Gvir, who belongs to the far-right faction and is considered Netanyahu’s ally. In other words, no new seats were added to the ruling coalition’s total; seats merely shifted within this coalition from Jewish Power to Likud. In subsequent days and weeks, no significant change occurred in this matter—i.e., the number of seats—and the coalition concluded the war in polls with approximately 51 seats. This situation has resulted in the second war with Iran producing virtually no positive effects for Netanyahu and the ruling coalition, leaving Netanyahu still trapped in the post-October 7 deadlock.

Another significant issue is that at the war’s outset, Israeli society’s expectations regarding war outcomes intensified considerably. In fact, polls conducted at the beginning of the war created a perception in Israeli public opinion that this war would result in the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the elimination of its nuclear and missile programs.

For example, examining polls by the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (which conducted four polls during and after the war), approximately 78 percent initially believed that overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran through this war was fundamentally feasible. This poll, conducted on March 2—three days after the war’s commencement—reflected Israeli society’s hope for Iran’s definitive defeat in the war. However, when the second poll was conducted on March 15, this figure declined from 78 percent to 65 percent and gradually decreased further. By April 15, when the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies conducted its final poll, the proportion of those who initially believed the Islamic Republic of Iran could be eliminated through war had dropped from 78 percent to 30 percent—a remarkably significant change.

In other words, approximately 65 percent of those in Israeli society who believed the war would cause the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran have changed their views. Additionally, the number of individuals who believed serious damage would be inflicted on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs has sharply declined; today, only about 30 percent of Israeli society believes such damage has been inflicted on Iran. Throughout the years following October 7, 2023, Israeli society had largely reached the conclusion that this regime, through its military, intelligence, and technological power—and with American assistance—could achieve any objective in West Asia and transform the region in any manner it desired. However, during the 40-day war with Iran, this perception has significantly weakened, with many reaching the conclusion that they cannot achieve their objectives against powerful governments and countries like Iran, which possess large populations and robust structures.

Ultimately, although domestic protests and dissatisfaction with policies and economic conditions exist within Iran, the perception of overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran within Israeli society has significantly diminished under the influence of the 40-day war’s outcomes. Continuation of this situation does not benefit Netanyahu and will destabilize his political position, as he has repeatedly promised the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the destruction of its nuclear and missile capabilities. Meanwhile, Iran has today succeeded in consolidating its power in West Asia.