Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the war has been examined by observers from different angles. Since the Ukraine war is a geopolitical issue between Russia as a major power and the West as a power bloc, the implications of the war for the possible rivalry between China and the United States as two other major powers can be examined. In fact, tensions and confrontations between the big powers have always contained many lessons and points for other big powers. Therefore, the question is what lessons can Beijing learn from the Ukraine war for Taiwan, given the serious US-China dispute over Taiwan?

The question is important because there are many similarities between Russia’s claim to eastern Ukraine and China’s claim to Taiwan. It can be deduced from Russia’s measures that it considers the recognition of two independent republics in eastern Ukraine as a means to reinforce its national security vis-a-vis NATO. China, on the other hand, considers Taiwan to belong to itself (which is also more legitimate and accepted internationally than Russia’s claim to eastern Ukraine), and its annexation to China strengthens China’s position in East Asia and the South China Sea.

On the other hand, just as the West supports Ukraine against Russia, it also supports Taiwan against China. In recent years, the West has equipped Taiwan and Ukraine with advanced weapons and trained their military forces. Accordingly, it is clear to Beijing officials that if Russia succeeds in achieving its goals in Ukraine, the path to their domination over Taiwan will be smoother, and if Russia fails, the task will become more difficult and harder for China.

It was in line with this assessment that with the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China neither condemned nor supported it, hoping that if one day China was obliged to use force to dominate Taiwan, it would not be opposed by Russia. According to this initial assessment, the ideal lesson, as well as China’s desire, is Russia’s victory in Ukraine in order to provide a prelude to China’s domination over Taiwan. This favorable demand prevailed in the political-media atmosphere of Beijing on the first days of the Ukraine war; but the Chinese seem to have distanced themselves from the initial optimistic approach and adjusted their position slightly in the days following the war.

China abstained from voting on a resolution against Russia in the UN General Assembly, sent financial aid to Ukraine, and if it had previously used terms such as “action or aggression” for the Ukraine crisis it used the word “war”. Of course, this does not mean that the Chinese position against Russia has sharpened, but it does mean that they are deeply concerned about the consequences of the Ukraine war for their economy, such as rising oil prices. That’s why the Chinese want the war come to an end. In fact, the reaction based on Western sanctions on the one hand and the negative consequences of the Ukraine war on the world economy have caused China to learn another lesson from the Ukraine crisis.

The important lesson they have learned from the Ukraine war for Taiwan was that the West was waiting for an opportunity. The fact that Western countries imposed more than 5,000 sanctions on Russia in 12 days and that 12 European countries, along with the United States, are providing arms to Ukraine, shows that the Ukraine war has become an opportunity and an excuse for the West to weaken Russia severely. China is well aware that the United States has formulated its official policy to counter China’s rise to power, so it will face strong pressure from the United States and its allies if it uses force to dominate Taiwan. In fact, not because the United States and its allies believe in Taiwan, but because Taiwan will become an excuse for massive economic sanctions against China, and the United States will seize this opportunity to weaken China. It is clear that the negative consequences of the Ukraine war for Europe, such as refugees, will not lead to a possible Taiwan crisis, but “making excuses for a new reality-building” is a lesson the Chinese have probably learned.

The Chinese are well aware that East Asian countries such as Japan, Singapore, and South Korea are supporting Western sanctions against Russia in order for the West to accompany them in a possible sanctions against China one day.

Therefore, Chinese officials, who have shown restraint and caution in foreign policy in recent years, do not seem to be falling into the trap that the West had set for Russia, and Moscow was entrapped into it. As a result, Beijing officials returned from optimism for the first two or three days of the war to the cautiousness and restraint of their foreign policy, and it is safe to say that unless China has not achieved a much higher position than it does today in the hierarchy of power in the international system, it will not resort to the same way that Russia resorted to in the case of Ukraine. The West’s coherence in imposing sanctions on Russian taught Beijing that the West was merely after an excuse in a legitimate form to weaken its rivals and enemies.