The United States’ unilateral withdrawal from key agreements (such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), the failure to extend New START, and the announcement of policies prioritizing “deterrence against two peer competitors” signal a transition from multilateralism to a transactional and unilateral approach.

The US program for extensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal—including new low-yield warheads and advanced delivery systems—not only disrupts strategic equilibrium but also sends a perilous message to other actors: “Arm for supremacy, not for stability.”

These policies, coupled with the expansion of the nuclear umbrella to regional allies and the lowering of the threshold for nuclear use, undermine international legal frameworks and normalize arms racing.

Risks Posed by the New Nuclear Competition to the Non-Proliferation Regime

The simultaneous emergence of China as a rapidly expanding nuclear power and Russia’s continued modernization and nuclear maneuvers—viewed in light of Trump’s policies in this arena—has ushered the world into a dangerous phase of “multipolar nuclear competition.”

This development targets the pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, as it first increases the incentive for nuclear-threshold states to pursue atomic weapons under the guise of “independent deterrence.”

Second, the erosion of arms control agreements—such as the expiration of New START—weakens patterns of verification and transparency, creating space for unilateral and destabilizing actions.

Third, the focus of major powers on “damage limitation” and graduated response options lowers the threshold for nuclear weapons use and heightens the risk of unintended escalation toward nuclear employment. In such an environment, the fundamental principles of the NPT—namely disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use—face selective interpretations and normative erosion.

Solutions to Deter Nuclear Powers from Escalating Competition

To avoid plunging into the abyss of atomic instability, nuclear powers must resist the temptation of “quantitative superiority” and focus on risk-reduction mechanisms.

In this regard, first, the urgent revival of bilateral and multilateral strategic dialogues—even in informal formats—is essential for clarifying doctrines and preventing miscalculations.

Second, agreement on “safety protocols” concerning emerging technologies (artificial intelligence, cyber, space) can prevent the dangerous integration of these capabilities with nuclear arsenals.

Third, strengthening regional non-proliferation regimes and establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones—particularly in West Asia—can provide a model for confidence-building.

Finally, a return to the principle of “deterrence sufficiency” rather than “absolute supremacy,” coupled with the acceptance of verifiable limitations on strategic arsenals, could steer competition toward the joint management of threats.

The United States and the Zionist Regime: Two Centers of Nuclear Threat

The United States, possessing the world’s largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal, maintaining a policy of “not ruling out first use,” and deploying tactical nuclear weapons at geopolitically sensitive locations, operates as the foremost nuclear threat to global stability.

This approach not only transforms deterrence into an offensive instrument but also establishes a dangerous precedent for other actors.

Meanwhile, the Zionist regime, with an estimated arsenal of 90 to 400 nuclear warheads, non-membership in the NPT, and rejection of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, constitutes a blatant violator of non-proliferation norms.

Relying on Washington’s unconditional support, this regime has not only remained exempt from international accountability but, through repeated threats against the region’s peaceful nuclear programs, has transformed itself into a destabilizing factor in the world’s most sensitive geopolitical flashpoint.

The continuation of this situation undermines the legitimacy of the NPT regime and increases the incentive for regional states to pursue alternative security options—including atomic weapons.

Strategic Conclusion

The global nuclear order stands at the threshold of a historic turning point. A return to stability requires the United States to move beyond unilateralist policies, for nuclear powers to accept their special responsibility in pursuing gradual disarmament, and for multilateral diplomacy to be revitalized to manage strategic competitions.

Without immediate action, the world will not only witness the complete erosion of the non-proliferation regime but also face a significantly heightened probability of limited nuclear conflicts—with catastrophic global consequences.

The preservation of international peace and security today, more than ever before, hinges upon collective wisdom, commitment to international law, and the prioritization of diplomacy over military posturing.