While Washington and its allies engage in consultations to form a “Hormuz Coalition” to reopen the strait and ensure the secure passage of commercial vessels, a fundamental geopolitical truth is deliberately overlooked. Without an agreement with Tehran, no coalition will be able to restore normal transit flows through this waterway. Military pledges and the deployment of naval fleets, when confronted with on-the-ground realities and Iran’s capacity to control the strait, represent less an operational solution and more an illusion of maritime security.

The first strategic error in understanding this crisis is the assumption that Iran would need to declare a blockade or engage in extensive mine-laying formally. The operational reality is far more complex. Dr. David B. Roberts, in an analysis for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) titled “The Problem of the Strait of Hormuz,” clearly demonstrates that Iran has brought the strait under its control without formally closing it.

Roberts explains: “A targeted front of missile and drone attacks against commercial vessels—limited in number but devastating in terms of impact on market psychology—has been sufficient to reduce transit volume by approximately 90 percent.” This strategy, coupled with the imposition of a coastal inspection corridor, has enabled Tehran to “reassert its de facto sovereignty over the waterway without formally blockading it.”

The statistical outcome of this situation underscores Iran’s capabilities. Of the vessels still transiting the strait, approximately 60 percent sail under the Iranian flag, are Iranian-owned, or are linked to Iran’s trade. Another one-fifth pertains to Greek-flagged vessels, whose owners are known for greater risk tolerance.

The Coalition’s Operational Dilemma

In response to this situation, discussions have emerged about forming a multinational “Hormuz Coalition.” The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), in a report by Lea Pedro titled “The Royal Navy in the Gulf,” has noted London’s readiness to assume a leading role in such a coalition.

However, even Keir Starmer, the British Prime Minister, has warned that reopening the strait “is not a simple task” and that any sustained effort would require broad coalition support, given the narrow geography and threats posed by mines, drones, fast-attack craft, and missiles.

Yet the problem extends beyond the number of warships. David Roberts’ analysis indicates that the strait’s operational geometry imposes a fundamental constraint. Referencing analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), he writes: “The Strait of Hormuz, with an approximate width of 30 kilometers, roughly corresponds to the operational scale of ‘drone slaughter zones’ that have characterized the war of attrition in Ukraine.”

In other words, any warship attempting to enter this narrow waterway to escort commercial vessels would itself become a target within range of Iran’s layered spectrum of threats—from loitering munitions and anti-ship missiles to contact mines. Roberts warns: “Introducing vessels into the strait creates a target-rich environment and imposes a difficult calibration between the necessity of engagement and the vulnerability arising from proximity.”

The Ground Option: Escalating Costs

Some speculation points to a potential plan by US aggressors and their allies to seize strategic islands such as Hormuz, Qeshm, or even Kharg Island via special forces operations. However, this option also confronts geographical realities and exorbitant costs.

In this regard, Roberts recalls that seizing Kharg—Iran’s most critical oil export terminal—while theoretically appealing, would be “exceptionally high-risk” from an operational standpoint. He explains: “Kharg, located at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, lies approximately 800 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz and 1,000 kilometers farther from the relatively secure, open waters of the Arabian Sea.”

Such an action would place US forces deep within Iran’s sphere of influence and expose them to its coastal artillery and missile systems.

Even if the United States sought to degrade Iran’s naval forces, analyses indicate that “Iran’s coastline is long, complex, and terrain highly familiar to its naval forces.” Neutralizing every potential launch site for missiles and drones is not a realistic operational objective.

The Corridor of the Global Food Supply Chain

The significance of these geopolitical realities is magnified when one recognizes that the Strait of Hormuz is not merely an energy artery but also a vital corridor for global food security. Bettina Rudloff, a researcher with the European Union’s research group, addresses this critical dimension in her analysis titled “The Hormuz Blockade, Fertilizer, and Hunger.”

Rudloff demonstrates that the current blockade has disrupted up to 30 percent of global oil and gas shipping, but its impact on fertilizer and agriculture is even more extensive. She writes: “Many countries on the Persian Gulf rim are among the major fertilizer exporters. If these shipments are lost, prices will rise further.” For instance, the price of urea (a key fertilizer indicator) has increased by up to 40 percent in recent weeks. Countries such as Brazil, India, and numerous African nations that directly source nitrogenous fertilizers from the Persian Gulf region stand at the forefront of this crisis.

This reality intensifies pressure on Washington to deliver a swift solution while simultaneously granting Tehran immense leverage. By controlling this waterway, Iran effectively exercises dominion over the food supply chains of millions in the Global South, as well as over European energy and fertilizer markets.

Reopening the Strait Is Feasible Only Through Agreement

The true benchmark for reopening the strait is neither the deployment of warships nor political statements. As David Roberts correctly states, the decisive criterion is the insurance market. The strait will be functionally reopened only when war-risk insurers underwrite transiting vessels at premiums that render passage economically viable.

He emphasizes: “That moment will not arrive merely through declarations of force posture or diplomatic statements. It will arrive only when the threat is demonstrably and sustainably reduced—which requires either the destruction of Iran’s maritime strike capacity at a scale and cost that Washington has not publicly contemplated, or a political agreement that neither side currently appears positioned to offer.”

Ultimately, any attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force not only faces nearly insurmountable technical and geographical obstacles but also ignores the fundamental reality that Iran has effectively consolidated its operational dominance over this critical artery of the global economy. The experience of the Tanker War in the 1980s demonstrated that sustained military conflict in this narrow waterway entails costs far exceeding any potential benefits for the belligerents and the global economy. Until political will emerges for an agreement with Tehran, the promise of a “Hormuz Coalition” will remain nothing more than a maritime security illusion.